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PREFACE 
Preface 
BeFinD is a consortium of four Belgian research centres at three different universities. It performs 
policy-oriented research related to the Financing for Development Agenda (2014-2017). The 
research is done on behalf of the Belgian Federal Public Service Foreign affairs, Foreign Trade and 
Development Cooperation, and hosted by the Flemish Inter-university Council (VLIR-UOS). The 
University of Namur (CRED), the University of Antwerp (IOB), and the University of Leuven 
(HIVA & GGS) are jointly coordinating research activities in 4 main areas: local resources for 
development, mobilising private resources for development, ODA and its relationship with other 
development-relevant funding flows, and global public goods. The research is oriented towards 
informing policies and practices of Belgian bilateral and multilateral development cooperation 
actors regarding the emerging landscape of development finance. HIVA-KU Leuven is contributing 
to the research activities on the redistributive potential of social protection, the role of the private 
sector in development, illegal financial flows, and global public goods. Our research on mobilising 
private resources for development, on which this paper reports, is designed to lay the foundation 
for further in-depth follow-up research by the other members of the BeFinD consortium, CRED 
and IOB in particular. 
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List of abbreviations 
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Summary 
Introduction 
This study maps and reflects on different 
approaches and instruments that official 
donors use to tap into or activate the for-
profit private sector’s variety of resources for 
the pursuit of development goals.  
It first provides an overview of the broader 
policy framework on Financing for 
Development and its different sub-agendas 
(chapter 2), as well as of the different types of 
instruments that can be used at the 
operational level (chapter 3). It then maps the 
current Belgian policy and practice regarding 
mobilising private resources for development 
(chapter 4), and it discusses how three other 
donors - United Kingdom, Switzerland and 
The Netherlands - have approached the issue 
(chapter 5).  
The provided information and analysis is 
based on literature review, document analysis 
and semi-structured expert interviews 
conducted in the first half of 2015. Some of 
the components that this exploratory study 
touches on will be investigated more in-depth 
in follow-up research by other members of 
the BeFinD consortium. . 
Key concepts & international debates 
Mobilising private resources, Financing for 
Development, private sector development, 
private sector for development, private sector 
engagement, innovative instruments… a 
considerable amount of conceptual overlap 
and confusion continues to hinder reflections 
and debate on the role of the private sector in 
development cooperation. This study uses 
the distinction between private sector 
development (PSD) and private sector for 
development (PS4D) or private sector 
engagement to clarify the scope of the 
mobilising private resources agenda. The 
former (PSD) groups all activities carried out 
by governments and development 
organisations with the aim of developing a 
vibrant private sector in developing 
countries, whereas the latter (PS4D) covers 
initiatives or activities that involve or engage 
private sector actors in development in ways 
that go beyond their regular business 
practices. However, the distinction is not 
always clear-cut, with PS4D sometimes 
having PSD goals. Elements of both can be 
found in each of the six pillars of the 
Monterey Financing for Development agenda 
(figure 1).  
Figure 0 Mobilising private resources: 
agendas 
 
It follows that the agenda of mobilising 
private resources for development is very 
broad, covering PSD and PS4D activities 
intervening at the local, the international or 
the systemic level, in a variety of domains 
(trade, development, debt), of operational as 
well as policy nature and interacting with 
different types of resource flows. It is 
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important to stress that the agenda for 
mobilising private resources is about more 
than just finance: it is about tapping into all 
possible private resources.  
Overview of instruments to mobilise private 
resources 
‘Mobilising’ suggest that the private resources 
are available, but that they somehow are not 
being used, or at least not for development, 
due to specific obstacles or a lack of 
incentives. Different development actors may 
have different means to address these 
obstacles and to ‘mobilise’ these resources. 
This study looked at official donors’ attempts 
to influence the private sector contribution to 
development, in particular their PS4D 
efforts. 
 
Grouped according to the type of obstacle 
donors attempt to tackle, the mapping 
distinguishes between: 
- Instruments acting against risk - aimed at 
reducing the risks that hold private actors 
back from committing their resources to 
development. This can include different 
types of insurance, credit guarantee 
mechanisms, currency swaps, safe 
corridors, etc. 
- Instruments addressing lack of finance - aimed 
at lifting financial constraints in order to 
leverage a bigger amount of additional 
private resources. This can include the 
provisions of grants, loans, equity and 
venture capital through different 
approaches such as challenge funds, 
impact investing, public-private 
partnerships, frontloading of ODA, 
output-based aid etc.  
- Instruments addressing lack of information, 
expertise or connections - intervene through 
knowledge sharing, capacity building or 
networking initiatives in order to 
capacitate private actors in a non-
material. This can include matchmaking 
initiatives, export promotion, capacity 
building of private actors, involving them 
in policy dialogue etc.   
- Instruments addressing loss of profits or 
competitiveness – aimed at levelling the 
playing field for private actors that 
engage in development. This can include 
standard setting, labelling and 
certification initiatives, regulating, 
piloting and building proof of concept 
for innovative business models, etc. 
What type of private sector actors is the 
instrument aimed at? What type of resources 
does it attempt to activate? What is the 
positive development impact it hopes to 
achieve? What role is the private sector 
playing (see figure 2)? The study shows that 
the insight in the different (types of) 
instruments used to mobilise private 
resources benefits from a systematic 
consideration of these questions.  
Figure 2 Roles of private sector in 
development 
 
 
A look across the board also reveals some 
cross-cutting issues. Firstly, there is too little 
reflection and awareness on the different and 
very specific roles that private and public 
finance can each play in development. That 
they can be used interchangeably with a 
similar impact is a very controversial and 
unproven assumption. Yet, in the use of 
public funds to leverage private resources the 
opportunity cost is often not taken into 
account. Secondly, quite some instruments to 
mobilize private resources for development 
are grafted on or make use of commercial 
financial services and products. Yet, not all 
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donors who employ such instruments have 
the expertise for a thorough monitoring and 
evaluation, and the lack of transparency and 
ethical behaviour in the financial sector has 
raised the question whether it is an 
appropriate and legitimate actor to manage 
public funds. Thirdly, blending is a key 
practice in the efforts to mobilize private 
resources for development. Blending refers 
to the practice of combining public 
development funds (in the form of grants, 
technical assistance or interest 
indemnification) with loans from public or 
private lenders. Yet here too several concerns 
are raised, in particular regarding the lack of 
transparency and accountability in blending 
facilities, the negative impact on country-
ownership of projects financed through 
blended resources, the lack of proof for the 
actual leveraging effect and the additionality 
of the private resources, and a lack of 
evidence for the actual development impact 
of blending mechanisms. 
Belgian development cooperation and the private 
sector agenda 
Except in relation to private sector 
development (PSD), the screened policy 
documents do not provide general guidelines 
on interactions of development actors with 
the private sector nor discuss the Belgian 
position on engaging the private sector for 
development (PS4D).  
The screening did allow identifying a set of 
actors that due to the nature of their mandate 
interact, directly or indirectly, with the private 
sector in a development context – with some 
actors within and some outside the scope of 
Belgian development cooperation (see figure 
3). These include a.o. Directorate General 
Development Cooperation (DGD), several 
European and multilateral institutions and 
programmes supported by the Belgian 
development cooperation, NGOs supported 
through the allocation ‘Entrepreneurship for 
Development’, some NGA’s receiving 
programme support,  the bilateral 
cooperation executed by BTC, its Trade 
Development Centre (TDC), the Belgian 
Investment Company for Developing 
Countries (BIO), and Finexpo.  
 
The discussion of their respective 
mandates, activities and instruments used 
reveals that Belgian development actors are 
doing PSD with an occasional touch of 
PS4D. The emerging map of the relevant 
actors and the interactions between them also 
raises some questions on the current 
institutional set-up for PS4D. The mandates 
and activities of relevant actors (e.g. BIO, 
BTC, Finexpo) are not developed with 
complementarity regarding PS4D in mind. 
This may undermine the possibility to engage 
the most appropriate actor and use the most 
appropriate instruments in a specific context. 
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Figure 3 Belgian actors in private sector for development 
 
 
 
 
Donor strategies: key dividing lines 
Insights from Dutch, British and Swiss policy 
and practice regarding PS4D provide a 
comparative perspective.  
The context of the policy (re)formulations on 
PS4D differed significantly in the three 
countries, depending on historical, budgetary 
and political factors. This had an impact on 
the forces and rationale driving the 
reconsideration of the role of the private 
sector, which in turns created different 
windows of opportunity regarding for 
example institutional reform or reprioritizing 
development cooperation.  
The institutional set-ups for interaction 
between development cooperation and 
private sector differ, with UK for example 
building in-house expertise and the 
Netherlands outsourcing to a specialized 
agencies and its development bank. However, 
looking at the institutional changes across the 
three different donors, one common feature 
emerges: as the private sector gains 
importance on the development agenda, the 
institutional capacity for private sector 
engagement and economic cooperation is 
increased. This seems to have been a crucial 
factor in allowing these donors to develop a 
stronger position and practice on PS4D.  
In their efforts to strengthen the links 
between the private sector and development 
cooperation, all three donors have made 
specific thematic and operational choices. : 
Which private sector to target? What types of 
instruments to use? What place for LDCs 
and MICs in this development agenda?   
Their experiences illustrate the many choices 
that have to be made and the difficulties that 
can rise when operationalizing them in a way 
that protects and ensures their development 
relevance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
With development actors putting the final touches to an ambitious post-2015 agenda for 
development, the need for a way to finance development is high on the global policy agenda. In 
2012 the finance gap of reaching the Millennium Development Goals by 2015 was calculated to be 
USD 120 billion a year. The future development agenda envisions encompassing all sustainable 
development needs. With a bigger agenda, the finance gap will be many times bigger as well1 
(Griffiths, Martin, Pereira, & Strawson, 2014; OECD, 2014).  
The current composition of financing sources for development does not seem up for the challenge. 
At the national level domestic resources are the largest source of development finance and within 
that category domestic government spending easily outranks domestic private investment – at least 
for most countries. However, although growing rapidly, public expenditure in many countries 
remains by far insufficient and the difficulties to scale up domestic resource mobilisation are huge. 
At the international level, Official Development Assistance (ODA) has been dwarfed by other 
(private) international resources flows2 over the past decade. Although it remains the largest flow to 
the least developed countries (LDC) and the countries with the lowest domestic resources, its 
relative importance declines. For ODA too, the prospects of scaling up are meagre. Globally, public 
finance is currently insufficient to meet all the development needs (Griffiths et al., 2014). 
Consequently eyes have turned towards other financial flows, and in particular to the private sector.  
Although interesting evolutions in the thinking on and practice of doing business are taking place, 
the dominant reality is that private sector actors lack incentives to engage with the development 
agenda. In response, development actors are looking for ways to mobilize private resources by 
using ODA as a catalyst (Griffiths et al., 2014). How do development actors attempt to mobilize 
private sector resources for sustainable development, and what are the main issues they have to deal 
with when doing so?  
This paper approaches this question from a policy as well as an operational perspective. It provides 
an overview of the broader policy framework on Financing for Development and its different sub-
agendas (chapter 2), as well as of the different types of instruments that can be used at the 
operational level (chapter 3). It maps the current Belgian policy and practice regarding mobilising 
private resources for development (chapter 4), and it discusses how three other donors - United 
Kingdom, Switzerland and The Netherlands - have approached the issue of mobilising private 
resources (chapter 5).  
 
 
1  What does the implementation of such a sustainable development framework cost? There have not been any systematic 
assessments of post-2015 development financing needs. However, the UNTT Working Group on Sustainable Development 
Financing’s report (2013) has compiled a range of best available sector estimates (UNTT Working Group on Sustainable 
Development Financing, 2013). 
2  International resource flows to developing countries have grown, with key components being foreign direct investments, lending 
and remittances. 
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CHAPTER 1 | RESEARCH RATIONALE  
1 |  Research rationale 
1.1 Research scope 
‘Financing for Development’,3 ‘private sector in development’, ‘private sector for development’, 
‘private sector development’ and ‘innovative instruments’: several research needs regarding these 
different yet related concepts competed with each other to determine the scope of this study. The 
study takes into account the broader context, set by the Financing for Development agenda and the 
debate on the role of the private sector in development cooperation. A mapping of the current 
Belgian development activities related to the private sector, wherein private sector development 
takes a lead role, is a crucial component in its design. Its focus however is on the subject of 
mobilising private resources for development.4  
Deconstructing the phrase ‘mobilising private resources for development’ reveals some avenues to 
further narrow the scope. It necessitates a clear conceptualisation of what ‘for development’ 
actually means, what ‘private’ actors and what ‘resources’ are referred to, and what it means to 
‘mobilise’ them. In some analyses the ‘private sector’ encompasses all non-state actors including 
private foundations, civil society organisations and private solidarity initiatives. This study, however, 
concentrates on the for-profit private sector, referring to all organisations that have a core strategy 
and mission to engage in profit-seeking activities through the production of goods, provisions of 
services and/or commercialization. Taking into account that businesses can opt for different 
balances between financial profits and social benefits, this includes financial institutions, micro, 
small and medium-sized enterprises, farmer cooperatives, large corporations, and social enterprises, 
operating in both the formal and informal economy. The private ‘resources’ are interpreted in a 
broad sense: they can be material as well as non-material and include i.a. finance, expertise, 
investments, standard setting capacity, tax contributions, networks, data, and image. The term ‘for 
development’ holds a crucial qualification, namely that the resources are being used in a way that 
pushed the private sector actor to go beyond its business-as-usual impact on development and aim 
for an explicitly pro-development impact. ‘Mobilising’ insinuates that the resources are available, 
but that they somehow are not being used, or at least not for development, due to specific obstacles 
or a lack of incentives. Different actors may have different means to address these obstacles and to 
‘mobilise’ these resources, but this study takes the perspective of official donors and looks at their 
attempts to influence the private sector contribution to development. To sum up, this study 
maps and reflects on different approaches and instruments that official donors use to tap 
into or activate the for-profit private sector’s variety of resources for the pursuit of 
development goals.  
1.2 Research questions  
Several research questions have been put forward to deliver on this research ambition step-by-step: 
(i) What do the concepts or agendas of ‘Financing for Development’, ‘private sector in 
 
3  The ‘Financing for Development’ agenda was launched at the Monterrey Conference in 2002. It has since shaped the conception 
of the means of implementation of the MDGs. 
4  This study is conducted in response to the 2014 call for policy support for Belgian policy makers on the topic of Financing for 
Development (FfD), which was taken up by BeFinD, The other three themes addressed in other work packages of the policy 
research center BeFinD are: mobilizing local resources for development, interpreting the term ODA and global public goods. 
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development’, ‘private sector for development’ and ‘mobilising private resources for development’ 
entail and how do they relate to each other?; (ii) Which mechanisms/instruments to mobilise 
private sector resources for development currently exist?; (iii) What are recent developments in the 
way selected donors of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD-DAC) mobilise private sector resources?; (iv) Which roles for private sector in 
development cooperation are and which are not called upon (in policy and practice) by Belgian 
development actors? What mechanisms are used to do so, and by which actors? What is known 
about their opportunities and risks? How does the Belgian policy and practice compare with other 
OECD/DAC donor activities? 
1.3 Research approach and methodology 
Data-collection was done through literature review, document analysis and semi-structured expert 
interviews. Core academic and policy-oriented publications were reviewed, including on the role of 
the private sector in development cooperation, on the recent evolutions in multilateral and bilateral 
donor policies on this matter, on the progress in related international policy processes and on 
specific instruments or strategies.  
A preliminary analysis of the collected information led to the selection of four OECD-DAC donors 
United Kingdom (UK), the Netherlands, the European Union (EU) and Switzerland as cases. The 
main reasons for this selection were the leading role of the UK, the Netherlands and the EU in this 
debate, and the comparability of Switzerland as a donor with Belgium. This selection was therefore 
envisioned, firstly, to deliver information on possible strategies and mechanisms from the British, 
Dutch and European experience. Secondly, to gain a better insight in how European policy and 
practice in this matter defines the broader context in which Belgian actors operate. Thirdly, to also 
touch on the issues of a small donor that is actively trying to position itself in this debate, such as 
Switzerland. An analysis of the publicly available and relevant policy documents as well as expert-
interviews with development officials of all selected donors were used for data collection per donor. 
During data analysis, the information on the UK, the Netherlands and Switzerland was clustered 
around three main topics: the rationale and recent policy choices underlying the relationship 
between development cooperation and the private sector, the institutional map of development 
actors involved in the interaction with the private sector, and specific approaches or instruments 
employed.  
An important tool in the analysis was the typology of roles for the private sector in development 
cooperation, developed by HIVA-KU Leuven in related research for the Flemish Government. 
This typology was based on several other existing typologies, all with their own strengths and 
limitations, and on insights collected through interviews and exploratory field work in South Africa 
in 2014. In this study it has been used to push the mapping of different types of instruments 
beyond the usual suspects, and to track the different roles for private sector in development 
cooperation that Belgian development actors call upon. 
Like with any study there are important limitations to take into consideration. First and most 
importantly, this study covers a lot of ground: it situates and dissects the broad debate on 
mobilizing private resources, it sets out to draw a map of the currently used instruments, and it 
analyses the actors and approaches that Belgium and other donors are putting into play. Such a 
broad scope in combination with limitations in time and resources also means this study sketches 
the broad outline of these different components but does not offer exhaustive information on each 
of them. Secondly, data collection though interviews has been limited to one or two respondents 
per case, which arguably is insufficient to ensure a complete picture of what the donor is or is not 
17 
 
CHAPTER 1 | RESEARCH RATIONALE  
doing on private sector. However, the respondents have been selected with care and were in all 
cases officials at the core of the private sector related activities of the donor. Finally, the EU has 
been included during data collection but mapping European development actors involved with the 
private sector and their practices, as well as gaining clear insight in the policy process behind these 
practices proved to be too ambitious for the time frame of this study. Information on EU tools has 
been taken into consideration in the chapters discussing the broader framework and the 
instruments in play, but the EU is not a fully-fledged case study.  
19 
 
CHAPTER 2 | KEY CONCEPTS & INTERNATIONAL DEBATES  
2 |  Key concepts & international debates 
2.1 Financing for Development from Monterrey to Addis Ababa  
With its Monterrey Conference in 2002 and the subsequent launch of a process to ensure financing 
for the development agenda, the United Nations (UN) have assumed a bigger role in shaping the 
financial and economic dimension of global development. The Monterrey Consensus identified six 
‘pillars’ that could provide the foundation for the sustainable financing of the global development 
agenda: (i) local resources, (ii) resources from abroad, (iii) international trade, (iv) development 
cooperation, (v) debt management and (vi) systems. It also introduced six corresponding ‘leading 
actions’: (i) mobilising domestic financial resources for development, (ii) mobilising international 
resources for development, such as foreign direct investments and other private flows, (iii) using 
international trade as an engine for development, (iv) increasing international financial and technical 
cooperation for development (v) managing external debt, and (vi) addressing systemic issues: 
enhancing coherence and consistency of the international monetary, financial and trading systems 
in support of development (Cortés Saenz, 2014; United Nations, 2003).  
More than a decade later the Financing for Development (FfD) agenda is in the run-up to its third 
major conference, planned for July 2015 in Addis Ababa. To ensure the implementation of the 
post-2015 development agenda, the third UN Conference on Financing for Development will aim 
to agree on a comprehensive and holistic financing strategy.5 On the agenda are i.a. the issues of 
unsustainable debt, tax competition and tax avoidance, declining ODA commitments, the reform 
of international finance institutions, and the role of private finance. In parallel, development 
ministers of the OECD-DAC discuss on how to modernise the definition of ODA for it to remain 
a relevant instrument in the post-2015 era. An important issue in this debate is how to reconcile the 
current definition and measurement of ODA with the trend of using ODA as a catalyst and lever to 
mobilise more private resources. The decisions taken in these policy processes will surely effect the 
future framework for mobilising private resources (Eurodad, 2014; ICESDF, 2014; Open Working 
Group, 2014).  
2.2 Private sector IN/FOR development  
Cutting across the FfD agenda is the ongoing debate on the role of the private sector in 
development cooperation. The private sector is since long considered as an important force in 
economic growth and, by extension, in development. Consequently it is the object of the private 
sector development agenda: a strong, well-developed private sector will drive development in 
developing countries. However, current views on the role of the private sector transcend this and 
consider private sector actors more and more as powerful development agents that could and 
should be directly involved in addressing current development challenges (Byiers & Rosengren, 
2012, p. 9). The private sector is thus assigned growing importance as a fully-fledged actor in the 
pursuit of global development.  
 
5  It will be followed soon after by the Post-2015 Summit and the Climate Change Conference, and thus features in a row of three 
major international events were the big issue at stake is how to achieve funding for specific goals. 
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Development actors, and increasingly the private sector itself, are experimenting with building 
bridges between business and global development, and aspire to scale-up these efforts in the future 
(Di Bella et al. 2013; Kindornay and Reilly-King 2013; European Commission 2014). At the same 
time however the debate on how to ensure the compatibility of a business rationale with 
development objectives, and on the legitimacy, efficiency and effectiveness of the private sector as a 
development actor is still ongoing. A clear distinction between different concepts is useful to 
navigate this debate. 
‘Private sector in development’ generally refers to private sector activities that are part of regular 
core business operations and that affect development outcomes and economic growth through 
positive impact such as job creation, provision of goods and services and taxation, and negative 
impact such as environmental degradation and poor labour practices (Di Bella, Grant, 
Kindornay, & Tissot, 2013b). An approach to improve the development impact of the private 
sector’ business as usual is private sector development. 
‘Private sector development (PSD)’ groups all activities carried out by governments and 
development organisations with the aim of developing a vibrant private sector. In particular since 
the 1980s, when the multilaterals’ development thinking moved away from the central role of the 
state and put forward a private economic development model, bilateral donors have implemented 
programs aimed at private sector development (Schulpen & Gibbon, 2002). According to the 
OECD (OECD, 2007, p. 21), the logic behind PSD is simple: ‘poverty reduction is the main 
objective of development cooperation and a target of development policies: Economic growth is 
essential for development, and growth is best achieved through the private sector, which in turn 
needs to be adequately promoted.’  
‘Private sector for development (PS4D)’ covers initiatives or activities that involve or engage the 
private sector in development in ways that go beyond their regular business practices. It is about 
finding ways to tap into businesses’ resources – e.g. their expertise, networks, data, and financial, 
technical and innovation capacity – and use them in the pursuit of development goals (Di Bella et 
al., 2013b).  
Different terms, such as PS4D or private sector engagement (PSE) are used to describe approaches 
that target the private sector in this way. Byiers and Rosengren (2012) use the distinction between 
the established PSD agenda (see 2.1.2) and the more recent PS4D agenda to highlight the different 
currents in the debate on the role of business in development cooperation. In their interpretation, 
the PS4D agenda6 is about donors working with private firms and finance (most often based in 
developed or emerging countries) for development purposes. This may include public-private 
partnerships, facilitating cross-sector partnerships, using the private sector as implementer of aid 
programmes, mobilising private sector finance, expertise and management capacity for 
development purposes, corporate social responsibility, social entrepreneurship, etc. However, the 
distinction is not always clear-cut, with PS4D sometimes having PSD goals (Byiers & Rosengren, 
2012). 
 
6  Within the PS4D agenda, Byiers (2012) makes an additional subdivision, between ‘private investment’ and ‘private finance’ for 
development. According to Byiers, the first is about channelling public money to private projects with a development component, 
assuming that the donor contribution to the private project will help to overcome existing private sector constraints and facilitate 
the project. The second is about using public money to leverage private funds for public projects, for example in the area of 
infrastructure. Again the donor contribution helps offsetting risks, liberating private funds but also mobilizing other private sector 
resources such as experience and knowhow. 
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Figure 2.1 Main concepts & agenda’s 
 
As figure 1.1 visualizes, PSD and PS4D cut across the FfD agenda. This is because in all 6 pillars 
one can envision possibilities to improve private sector’s development impact, as well as to scale-up 
private sector’s engagement for development. On top of that PSD and PS4D can overlap, with one 
being used to promote the other. For example, looking at ways to mobilize local resources for 
development, PSD can contribute to job creation which could increase the domestic tax base and 
thus tax revenues, while PS4D could be about pushing local companies to invest part of their 
profits in social goals (e.g. education). Looking at resources from abroad, PSD could aim to 
facilitate foreign direct investments to developing countries, while PS4D could aim to mobilise 
international private finance and expertise to tackle a specific development challenge, such as 
malnutrition (e.g. GAIN). It is important to recognize the overlap and interplay between these 
different agenda’s and domains: it is not evident and sometimes misleading to fit certain approaches 
or initiatives in one and only one box.  
2.3 Mobilising private resources 
Efforts to strengthen the role of private sector in development through private sector development 
or part of the quest to ‘mobilise private resources’ but as the addition ‘for sustainable development’ 
implies, the key ingredient is engaging private sector for development (PS4D).  
Compared to other financial flows to developing countries, the relative importance of ODA has 
decreased rapidly, despite an increase in absolute terms and an all-time high in 2013. Together, 
public and private resources from developing countries themselves accounted for 84% of total 
available development finance in 2010. On the other hand, public international finance – grants, 
concessional and non-concessional funding from the development assistance community – 
amounted to approximately  2% (OECD, 2014). FDI, ODA and the finance raised and managed by 
non-governmental organisations, may have played an important role for many years, but other 
more recent sources of finance are now providing important and complementary financial and 
technical support. 
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Figure 2.2 Trends in development assistance flows 
 
* NTPs stands for non-traditional providers 
Source (Greenhill, Prizzon, & Rogerson, 2013; House of Commons, 2014) 
Greenhill et.al. point out trends in non-traditional development assistance (see figure 2.2.), with the 
growing role of climate finance, social impact investment, other financial flows, philanthropy and 
private giving clearly showing. In its latest development report, OECD also explores other more 
recent sources of finance that are now providing important and complementary financial and 
technical support that can be harnessed for development. These include South-South co-operation; 
institutional investors, such as pension funds; developing countries’ own revenues raised through 
taxation; funds raised by philanthropic foundations; and remittances sent home by migrants 
working overseas. The OECD also stresses that each of these sources of finance has distinctive 
attributes and motivations that determine their suitability for different purposes (OECD, 2014).  
Amongst these different sources of finance that need to complement ODA is the private sector. 
Within the attempts to mobilise private sector 
resources, ‘innovative financing mechanisms’ have 
been introduced as an important tool. Again defining 
this concept presents a challenge, as there is no 
universally agreed definition and the use of the term 
has changed over time. Helpful is the European 
Commission’s distinction between innovative funding 
sources and innovative financing mechanisms. The 
first refers to new sources of development financing 
that could complement official development 
assistance (ODA) in a stable and predictable way (e.g. 
airline ticket tax, financial transaction tax). The latter 
refers to funds and instruments that are designed and 
run by donors to have a leveraging or catalysing effect by providing part of the total requisite 
funding as ODA (e.g. through using loans, equity investment, mezzanine finance or guarantees) in 
order to attract additional funding, notably from private companies, to invest in projects and 
initiatives in developing countries with explicit development impact objectives. Beyond financial 
leverage and risk sharing, the private sector can add value by providing its expertise and technical 
Other more recent sources are providing 
important and complementary financial and 
technical support that can be harnessed for 
development. (...) The overall sense is of a 
new, exciting but complex landscape, whose 
contours are still to be fully fleshed out. Our 
challenge now - and the challenge of the 
international community as a whole - is to 
explore their possibilities and harness them 
creatively to the full. (OECD, 2014, p. 10). 
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know-how thus realising efficiency gains and long-term growth (SDC traverse, 2014). It is 
important to note a crucial difference between these two definitions: the first considers innovative 
financing initiatives as ways to raise additional public finance for development objectives, the latter 
includes mechanisms to use public finance to incentivise or leverage private finance (Griffiths et al., 
2014). However, it is important to stress that the agenda for mobilising private resources is about 
more than just finance: it is about tapping into all possible private resources. 
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3 |  Overview of instruments to mobilise private 
resources 
3.1 Analytic tools 
The objective of this chapter is to gain better insight in the many instruments that donors have put 
into play to mobilize private resources for sustainable development. However, it does not offer an 
exhaustive list of descriptions of all instruments used to mobilize private resource. In development 
practice these instruments are used in many different ways, in varying combinations and are often 
reinvented to target a different type of actor, achieve a new objective. Consequently tools or 
frameworks to understand and typify the different instruments seem more helpful than a static list. 
This section discusses two analytic tools. The first is a further dissection of the phrase ‘mobilizing 
private resources for development’, that can be used to typify the different instruments by their 
objectives and target actor. The second is a typology of the different roles that private sector actors 
can play in development cooperation.7 It allows for a better understanding of the different roles 
private sector actors are or can play in the interactions between them and official donors.  
3.1.1 Dissection of mobilizing private resources for development 
Demarcating the scope of this study already led to a first deconstruction of the ‘mobilizing private 
resources for development’ agenda (see section 1.1). A further exploration of its different 
components helps to better understand the diversity of the instruments it encompasses.  
The ‘private sector’ seems to be the core component in this phrase but often this term is an 
unhelpful simplification of a very diverse group of actors, as it can include a multinational 
corporation as well as sole social entrepreneur and many types of private sector actors in between. 
Even when focusing on ‘for-profit’ private sector, is still covers a variety of actors that differ in the 
size of their organizations, the scale of their activities, the geographical scope of their operations, 
their country of origin/establishment (e.g. partner or donor country), their business model and 
corporate philosophy (e.g. looking for maximal profit or maximal social/societal value) and their 
place in the formal or the informal sector. It is important to recognize that in their attempts to 
mobilize private resources, donors can target a wide variety of private sector actors (see table 3.1).  
A similar exercise can be done for ‘resources’. Policy documents as well academic publications 
stress the diversity of resources that private sector actors have at their disposal - resources that they 
may or may not commit in a way that maximizes the positive development impact. Although some 
analyses specify that these include ‘financial and in-kind’ or ‘material and non-material’ resources, 
the different types of resources are often not identified and named explicitly. Investigating different 
instruments and their specific goals does however give a good idea of the main types of resources 
targeted (see table 3.1). Again it seems important to recognize the diversity of resources in play, 
especially when assuming that instruments should ideally be tailored to the specific type of 
resources they aim to mobilize. 
 
7  This typology has been developed in the framework of the study ‘The role of the private sector in development cooperation’ 
conducted for the Flemish research centre on Foreign Policy, International Entrepreneurship and Development cooperation in 2014. 
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‘Why do these resources need to be mobilized?’ seems to be the next logical question. Apparently, 
the resources are available, but due to specific obstacles they are not employed, or at least not in the 
desired way. Arguably a good instrument should be tailored to the type of obstacle it is supposed to 
address, but again a clear overview of such obstacles seems to be missing. Taking note of the logic 
and the objectives of the different instruments this study came across, a (non-exhaustive) list of 
obstacles that are being addressed was compiled (see table 3.1) 
One more component needs to be clarified: ‘for development’. The different concept definitions 
(see section 2.2) already gave a first broad indication of what ‘for development’ could mean. In 
practice a ‘pro-development impact’ can mean many different things. It seems to be important to 
identify what the specific intended development impact of an instrument actually is. Although some 
popular development outputs or outcomes have been listed as an illustration, understanding the 
intended impact is an exercise that needs to be done for each individual instrument. The concept 
outline of an instrument may for example state the aim of creating decent jobs whereas in practice 
the focus is on job creation - without a clear operationalization for ensuring that the jobs are 
decent. The concept outline may also focus a specific aspect of the instrument - such as SME 
development – whereas looking at the actual implementation may reveal that private sector is also 
involved in other roles (such as for example sponsor, or mentor). 
Table 3.1 Dissection of ‘mobilising private resources for development’ 
 
 
* R&D stands for research and development; BoP stands for Bottom of the Pyramid; SME stands for small 
and medium sized enterprises, MNC stands for multinational corporations. 
Instruments to mobilize private sector resources can be simple as well as complex: in some cases 
they target one obstacle for a specific private actor in order to mobilize a specific type of resource, 
in other cases they want to tackle multiple obstacles for multiple actors at the same time in order to 
mobilize different types of resources. Anyhow, the typology of roles that private actors can play in 
development cooperation (discussed in the next section) helps to further dissect different 
instruments and how they are used. 
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3.1.2 Typology for private sector roles in development 
A second analytic framework - complementary to and in some ways overlapping with the first 
one - is the typology for private sector roles in development. This typology (see table 3.2) identifies 
and characterizes ten different roles that a private sector actor can play in development activities: 
- A first set of two roles points out that the private sector can be a resource provider in 
development activities, by contributing in a material (finance, in-kind) or non-material (expertise, 
network, data) way.  
- Next, the typology identifies four ways in which the private sector can be a beneficiary in 
development activities. It can benefit from the donor efforts to improve the business climate, 
from capacity building, knowledge sharing, information provision or networking initiatives, from 
financial support by other development actors and from implementation contracts for specific 
development activities.  
- Also, private sector can be the target of actors who want to influence business practices to 
become less harmful or more development oriented. Government can hope to influence through 
regulation whereas NGOs can use public campaigns or other lobby and advocacy tools. 
- Private sector actors can engage in reforming or reinventing the way they do business. The 
typology distinguishes between reformers, who change their business practices to align it more 
with development goals, and developers/implementers who invent entirely new business models 
and/or implement them.  
- Finally private sector can also be an active participant in different policy processes, such as 
consultation, policy dialogues, or multi-stakeholder initiatives. This can take place at different 
levels, from the local to the global. 
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Table 3.2 Roles of private sector in development cooperation 
 Role of the private sector actor Examples (not exhaustive) 
1 Resource provider - finance 
Private sector invests financial resources. 
 Corporate philanthropy, e.g. Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation, Philips Foundation, local companies sponsoring 
start-up competition. 
 Businesses investing in/managing investment funds with 
development objective. 
 Impact investing. 
2 Resource provider - expertise and other strategic 
resources 
Private sector invests its expertise, network, data, 
research capacity ... in activities with particular 
development relevance undertaken by or in 
partnership with other companies, government 
agencies, or NGOs. 
 Established SMEs coach start-up SMEs. 
 Established entrepreneurs/managers share expertise with 
peers. 
 Bottom of the pyramid product development. 
 Frugal innovation technologies. 
 Allow consumer data or network to be used in development 
initiatives. 
3 Beneficiary - enabling environment 
The private sector is the beneficiary of efforts to 
create an enabling business environment. 
 Improving the business climate to stimulate business and 
investment. 
 Removing red tape obstructing SME development.  
 Infrastructure development needed for take-off of growth 
sectors. 
4 Beneficiary - capacity development, information 
provision & knowledge sharing 
The private sector is the beneficiary of capacity 
development, information provision and/or 
knowledge sharing initiatives that aim to increase 
private capacity to contribute to developmental goals. 
 Capacity development of Business Development Services 
(e.g. chambers of commerce). 
 Building business capacity on development challenges and 
possibilities to address them.  
 Donor agencies/embassies investing in information 
provision on business opportunities in developing countries.  
5 Beneficiary - financial support 
The private sector is the beneficiary of financial 
support that aims to catalyse private sector activity or 
investment with particular development impact. 
 Donor capitalization of Development Finance Institutions 
(DFIs).  
 DFIs supporting SMEs with activities in developing 
countries. 
 Challenge fund to support innovation or job creation. 
 Donors providing credit guarantees to catalyse high risk 
private investments with potential development benefits. 
6 Beneficiary – of contracts for implementing aid 
projects & programmes 
The private sector is involved in the execution of 
development activities, in the role of subcontractor. 
 Participation of consultancy groups & companies in 
development cooperation tenders (e.g. in social sectors such 
as education & health). 
 Tied aid. 
7 Target – of regulation, lobby or advocacy 
The private sector is pushed by global governance 
institutions, governments or civil society 
organisations to change business practices. 
 Public campaign by international NGO condemning 
business practices of a multinational. 
 Government using regulation to foster responsible fiscal 
business practices. 
8 Reformer – adapting existing business models 
through Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate 
Social Accountability or Stakeholder Value 
Maximization  
The private sector adapts its own business model to 
increase its positive development impact and 
sustainability. 
 
 Make product value chain more sustainable & inclusive. 
 Offering product transparency. 
 Invest in third party certification of social & environmental 
commitments. 
9 Developer/implementer – implementing new, social, 
inclusive or solidarity economy initiatives and 
business models 
The private sector develops and implements a new 
(inclusive, social, solidary) business model or 
initiative with particular development relevance. 
 Social entrepreneurs developing a profitable sustainable 
business model that prioritizes both social as well as 
economic added value. 
 Businesses aiming to include vulnerable groups in their 
supply chain. 
10 Participant – in policy dialogue & multi-stakeholder 
initiatives on development-related issues 
The private sector takes part in development related 
policy dialogue or multi-stakeholder initiatives that 
aim to influence business and development policy 
and practice. 
 Participation in policy dialogue on post-2015 Sustainable 
Development Goals framework. 
 Join forces with other development actors (e.g. NGO) to 
lobby for policy reforms regarding social or ecological issues. 
 Participation in tripartite negotiations & multi-stakeholder 
initiatives on decent work. 
 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). 
 United Nations Global Compact. 
The role-based typology looks at the private sector’s role in development cooperation from a donor 
perspective. It covers both PSD and PS4D approaches.  
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3.2 Mapping instruments 
A selection of key publications (Bilal et al., 2014; Di Bella, Grant, Kindornay, & Tissot, 2013a; Di 
Bella et al., 2013b; Humphrey, Spratt, Thorpe, & Spencer, 2014; Kindornay, Higgins, & Olender, 
2013; Kindornay & Reilly-King, 2013) in combination with the information gathered through the 
interviews offers material to use these frameworks for a more detailed identification and illustration 
of the different groups of instruments. As pointed out earlier, the focus lies on instruments aimed 
at mobilizing private resources for development (PS4D) and not on private sector development 
instruments.  
A first group of instruments is acting against risk. The assumption is that private actors are not 
committing their resources because the risks are too high. Development actors can deploy 
instruments that attempt to reduce those risks, often by (at least partially) carrying the risks 
themselves. Private sector actors are beneficiary of such instruments, but with the explicit 
expectation that this catalyses private resources, and thus that private sector in turn becomes a 
provider of resources, or takes on a reformer/developer role.  
Examples: 
- Instruments that fit in this category are the different types of insurance that development actors 
can provide to enable or encourage private investment in developing countries. This may include 
political risk insurance, catastrophe or weather insurance. Such insurance can be provided 
through national public credit insurers as well as through multilateral agencies such as, for 
example, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). 
- In the same line are (partial) credit guarantee mechanisms, where a borrower of private 
finance can sell (parts of) the risk to a development bank that will step in in case of default. 
Development actors provide such guarantees for example to (M)SMEs active in developing 
countries that otherwise do not get access to credit. 
- Another example in this category are the ‘safe corridors’, where governments enable the transfer 
of resources to developing countries by monitoring money transfers to ensure that they are not 
diverted to the wrong recipients or causes. This has been the case in the UK, where the 
government decided to intervene through the establishment of safe corridors in order to 
convince commercial banks such as Barclays to continue their money transfer services to Somalia. 
Remittances are an important buffer resource for many Somali, but banks considered closing 
their operations because the transfers were at risk of being used for money laundering and 
terrorism funding. 
- Currency swaps also fit this category. A currency swap involves two parties that exchange a 
notional principal with one another in order to gain exposure to a desired currency. Following the 
initial notional exchange, periodic cash flows are exchanged in the appropriate currency. Currency 
swaps can improve the access to local currency financing and thus leverage foreign investments 
by reducing the risk of currency mismatches. At the moment, currency swaps are only available 
for a few currencies and thus several development partners have initiated projects directed 
towards the development of new markets for long-term finance in local currencies. One example 
is the TCX, a fund created by donors, development banks and international banks, that provides 
investors in emerging markets with exchange rate and currency risk management instrument and 
strategies (Bilal et al., 2014) 
A second and important group of instruments aims to address a lack of finance. The assumption 
is that private sector actors are not using their resources because they lack the financial capacity to 
do so. However, this does not necessarily mean that these instruments only attempt to mobilize 
non-financial resources (such as productive investment, or expertise or R&D). On the contrary, in 
current practice quite some instruments address financial constraints in the hopes of leveraging a 
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much bigger amount of additional financial support. Consequently, the most common role for 
private sector in these instruments is as beneficiary of financial support, although with the clear 
expectation that this will enable the private actor to become a provider of resources or a 
reformer/developer of more development-oriented business models. At the same time, the toolkit 
to address a lack of finance is often used in private sector development (PSD), where private sector 
is considered as a beneficiary that in return should mostly do what responsible private sector does: 
create decent jobs, produce relevant goods or services and pay taxes. This set of instruments uses 
grants, loans, equity, guarantees or a combination of those to unlock private resources.  
Examples: 
- Development actors can offer direct grants to enterprises to enable a project or specific activities 
with expected development outcomes. This can be done for example through challenge funds 
that award public grants (or loans) through competitive selection to a private project with 
development potential. Specific types of challenge funds include innovation funds that enable 
innovative solutions to address specific development challenges (e.g. develop a solution for lack 
of access to drinking water), or an enterprise challenge fund that supports private sector 
development. 
- Development actors, and especially development finance institutions, can also be involved in 
providing direct loans8, quasi-equity9 or equity to enterprises that want to boost specific 
activities with a pro-development dimension. This can happen in a direct way as well indirectly 
through funds. Such funds can have very different objectives, composition, governance structure 
and transparency practices that determine their potential to address development challenges. 
Private equity funds, for example, are managed by a private actor and often don’t offer 
participating development banks many levers to influence the investment decisions. 
- A venture capital fund aims to direct investments to start-up and small and medium-size 
enterprises with promising potential. Without the involvement of development actors, such an 
investment fund may focus solely on seeking private equity stakes in high-risk/high-return 
opportunities. Development actors may get involved to influence the investment policy and make 
such funds more development-oriented. 
- Promoting socially responsible investments is also on the table. This type of investments seeks 
to maximize both financial return and social good, by avoiding harmful-side effects of financial 
products or investments and by favouring investments that promote community development. 
- A step up from socially responsible investments is impact investing. It aims to generate specific 
beneficial social or environmental effects in addition to financial gain. Impact investing can be 
considered as part of socially responsible investing, but the latter is more aimed at avoiding harm, 
whereas impact investing actively seeks to make a positive impact. Development actors can get 
involved directly and act as impact investors, or they can play a facilitating role by preparing 
interesting impact investment opportunities for private impact investors. Providing finance for a 
market study, a feasibility study, project development or ‘proof of concept’ are examples of this.  
- Public private partnerships can also be considered here (although they are in fact so diverse 
that they fit in many categories). PPPs were initially rather narrowly defined, with the key 
components being a public service, a private executioner, and the public and private partner 
pooling investment and sharing risks. The term PPP now stretches a variety of cross-sector 
collaborations that differ depending on the types of actors involved, the role division, the 
objective, and the operational modalities. Existing classifications distinguish, for example, 
 
8  Different types of loans can be used, e.g. investment loans (to support a pre-defined project, and with matching funding by the 
private firm), syndicated loans (where a group of actors provides a loan to a single borrower and share the risk), financial 
intermediary loans (from a development bank to a financial intermediary such as a private bank). 
9  Quasi-equity fills the gap between debt and equity. It is usually structured as investments where the financial return is calculated as 
a percentage of the investee’s future revenue streams. Often the return is capped (to a maximum amount) or limited in time. 
Quasi-equity provides a more equal sharing of risk and reward between investor and investee. 
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between partnerships aimed at engaging with private sector activities for development purposes 
and those using ODA to leverage private sector finance (Bilal et al. 2014). Another distinction is 
made between partnerships aspiring to increase the development impact of the core business 
activity of the private partner, and those that contribute to the private provision of public goods 
(Heinrich 2013). In sum PPPs today can fit in types of instruments depending on their specific 
set-up. 
- Another way to trigger private involvement in development related activities is through output-
based aid. This refers to strategies that link the delivery of public services in developing 
countries to targeted performance-related subsidies. The service provider will receive subsidies to 
replace costs associated with providing the service to people, such as user fees. Individual agents 
will verify that the service is being delivered and based on the performance of the service-
provider, a subsidy will be granted. 
- Development impact bonds (inspired by social impact bonds) would also be a form of output-
based aid, but in this case the private sector would fund and implement a public development 
programme and be remunerated depending in the outcome of the programme. 
- Frontloading of ODA can also fit in this category (and arguably also in the previous category), 
because it involves development actors making legally binding long term ODA commitments to a 
specific cause or initiative in order to convince relevant private actors of their continued support. 
By doing so they tackle the risk of changing political agendas and engagements and the 
abandonment of initiatives that only deliver on longer term. Additionally, binding ODA pledges 
can be converted into immediate financial resources by securitizing part of future ODA budgets. 
This allows development finance to be increased in the medium term at the expense of the 
budget in the longer term. This has been applied by the International Finance Facility for 
Immunisation (IFFIm), initiated in 2006 to accelerate the availability of funds for immunization. 
The resources generated have been used to support immunization programmes through the 
GAVI Alliance (UN DESA, 2012). 
Private actors may also refrain from committing specific resources to development because they 
lack the necessary information, expertise or connections to do so. To remedy such limitations 
development actors can intervene through knowledge sharing, capacity building or networking 
initiatives. Private actors are then considered as the beneficiaries of these initiatives, but with the 
expectation that this will enable them to play the role of provider of resources or of reformer or 
developer of business models.  
Examples: 
- Some export and investment promotion programs may fit in this category. Such programs are 
aimed at the private sector in the donor country. They often include the provision of information 
on business opportunities in developing countries, the organizations of networking events or 
scoping missions, the provision of assistance on doing business in developing countries or 
assistance in determining the feasibility of certain business ideas. However, it is sometimes hard 
to determine to what extent such programs are government support for the internationalization 
of the own private sector and to what extent they also have a real development dimension.  
- A common tool in this toolbox is match-making. Quite some development actors manage 
match-making facilities that aim to link donor country business to partner country business. The 
main goal can be to connect possible business partners, but some matchmaking initiatives are 
about business to business (B2B) technical assistance, with entrepreneurs from developed 
countries providing expertise to capacity constraint enterprises in developing countries. 
- Attempts to connect different private actors can take a very practical form, with development 
actors funding the development and implementation of a tool to address the problem. For 
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example subsidizing the creation of IT solutions to link companies across boundaries could fit 
the picture. 
- Development actors may also decide to provide capacity building to private actors on how to 
act in a more development relevant manner. Assisting a company to analyse its value chain and 
make it more inclusive, for example. Or working with companies on how they can minimize their 
ecological footprint. Or training commercial banks on how they can provide financial services to 
MSMEs. In some cases such support can also be offered through challenge funds.  
- Going beyond knowledge transfer, development actors can invest in piloting certain activities to 
provide ‘proof of concept’ and demonstrate that the activity is feasible and profitable.  
- Development actors may also invest in strategic partnerships with donor-based MNCs, large 
companies or organizations representing business, in order to keep open communication lines (to 
negotiate with business on how to create more synergies between their activities and development 
objectives). 
- A step up from strategic partnerships is the active engagement of private sector actors in policy 
dialogue on different topics and levels. The lack of knowledge is one obstacle addressed by 
instruments that help to acquaint private sector actors and agendas with development actors and 
agendas, and vice versa. Such initiatives may also aim to feed a sense of ownership of 
development policy amongst private sector actors. They can take many different shapes and sizes, 
from consultative fora to participatory policy development 
Development actors can also attempt to encourage private sector actors to adapt their business 
model in order to improve the development impact and sustainability, or to develop and implement 
radically new business models or initiatives with particular development relevance. Examples are 
inclusive business models, social enterprises or initiatives in solidarity economy. On top of a lack of 
finance and a lack of knowledge, capacity or connections, the fear for loss of profits or loss of 
competitiveness may hinder this. Different instruments can be put into play to make such efforts 
more interesting for business. This can be done by providing access to finance, or through capacity 
building and networking schemes (see above) but also by making the reorientation or reinvention 
of business practices more rewarding. On the other side of this coin are the instruments that can be 
used to force private actors to respect certain standards or engage in initiatives. 
Examples: 
- Supporting standard setting initiatives (e.g. codes of conduct, sector standards), labelling 
and/or (third party) certification schemes can be a way to influence or ‘discipline’ company 
behaviour. Such schemes can provide guidance for companies that want to produce or operate in 
a more development-oriented way and, more importantly, they can make efforts in this regard 
more visible. This allows companies to take credit for their efforts and where possible use them 
as a competitive advantage. Such initiatives can be private sector-led or multi-stakeholder, and 
development actors can be involved in different degrees.  
- Development actors can also decide to use all the different instruments discussed above to 
support a specific type of business, for example by providing access to finance to social 
enterprises. Or to limit their cooperation with enterprises whose business practices are not 
conform specific criteria (e.g. regarding labour conditions, environmental impact, tax 
contributions). 
- When approaching private sector actors more as a ‘target’, (governmental) development actors 
can put in place regulation that forces all private actors to respect certain standards or objectives, 
thus providing a level playing field for all private actors involved. (Civil society) development 
actors can do lobby and advocacy, or organize public campaigns that ‘name and same’ 
enterprises with harmful practices, thus giving them incentives to change their practices. 
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- Piloting specific business models that can be sustainable or even profitable while at the same 
time realizing a positive development impact (e.g. benefits for the poor or disadvantaged groups, 
tackling a development challenge) can also be used by development actors to provide proof-of-
concept for innovative development-oriented business models. Development actors can also 
provide direct support for business innovation thus tackling the financial as well often capacity 
constraints. 
3.3 Emerging issues 
This overview of types of instruments does not offer any appreciations of the different instruments 
in play. A discussion on the merits and risks of each of them is outside the scope of this study. 
However, there are several cross-cutting issues regarding the instruments that development actors 
currently use to mobilize private resources.  
3.3.1 Public and private finance are not interchangeable 
The quest to mobilize private resources for development is gaining traction. It is clear that many 
UN and OECD member states are considering the private sector as a crucial source of financial 
means to implement development policies (e.g. the sustainable development goals). Indeed, there is 
a strong case for increasing the role of the private sector in development, but despite the wide 
variety of roles private sector could play and despite the wide variety of resources private sector has 
at its disposal, efforts are currently strongly focused on mobilizing private financial resources.  
At the same time there is very little reflection on how public resources may have a different role to 
play than private resources and vice versa. This suggests the assumption that the two are 
interchangeable. Griffith et al. (2014) point out that this is a controversial assumption unsupported 
by analyses of current public and private finance flows. They point out that public finance acts 
more predictably and plays an important role in protecting and providing public goods. 
International private finance on the other hand tends to bypass lower income countries and focus 
on higher income countries, where more profitable and less risky opportunities exist. For the same 
reason private finance only has limited potential to support MSMEs in developing countries. This is 
a big issue as the private sector in developing countries is exactly dominated by MSMEs, mostly in 
the informal sector, and their main difficulty is access to private finance. Also, because private 
finance is for-profit, it will require additional public support (regulation or catalytic investment) to 
deal with some of development constraints. The main point is that private finance is not guided by 
the same interests and principles as public finance and consequently will not act the same way. Yet, 
the question on how to ensure that public interest and development objectives are safeguarded 
when public funds are used to mobilize private finance receives little attention. 
3.3.2  Financialisation of aid 
As the examples above show, quite some instruments to mobilize private resources for 
development are grafted on or make use of financial services and products. This raises concerns on 
several fronts. Firstly, the crisis of 2008 has made it painfully clear that the financial sector needs to 
be better regulated in order to avoid malpractice, irresponsible risk-taking and speculation on basic 
foodstuffs. Although some steps have been taken, the current regulatory framework is not 
sufficient. This begs the question how coherent it is to channel public development funds through 
commercial financial services and products. It seems fair to wonder whether the impact of 
thoroughly regulating the financial system to put it more at service of public interest should not be 
the priority, rather than adapting public developing funds to fit the current financial system (‘FfD - 
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Financialization issues CSO briefing,’ 2015). Secondly, policy development on and monitoring and 
evaluation of the public development funds spent through this toolkit of financial services and 
products also implies a specific expertise that traditional development actors may not have in-
house.  
3.3.3 Blending 
A mechanism that in fact embodies the two previous issues is blending. Blending refers to the 
practice of combining public development funds (in the form of grants, technical assistance or 
interest indemnification) with loans from public or private lenders. Combining grants with loans is 
established practice for most development banks, but the current involvement of private lenders 
and the rising popularity of this practice are new. The term blending now refers more to the use of 
public funds to trigger additional private involvement (compared to a previous emphasis on 
combining grants and loans). End of 2014 the European Council endorsed conclusions that place a 
heavy focus on ‘blending’ as a tool of development cooperation. Other donors are following suit. 
Donors can manage or participate in facilities that offer a combination of ODA-based grants and 
(commercial) loans to make private projects more attractive to private investors and mobilize 
additional private capital. Despite its rise to common practice in development cooperation, 
blending is controversial. 
A key argument for blending is that the allocation of ODA will leverage additional private finance 
and thus trigger a scale-up of the involvement of private financiers. However, there are some 
important concerns regarding blending. Firstly, so far there seems to be no reliable evidence to 
show that blending mechanisms are actually applied in line with and contributing to development 
objectives. Secondly, existing lending facilities have no appropriate mechanisms to involve 
developing countries’ stakeholders, which risks undermining country ownership. Thirdly, the 
activities of blending facilities lack transparency and accountability, and insufficient information is 
made available to the public (Griffiths, 2012; Romero, 2013). 
In addition, current blending practices struggle to prove their leveraging effect of additional private 
finance. Additionality involves considerations about the extent to which public money is used to 
achieve development outcomes that otherwise would not have happened. This can be further 
divided in ‘financial or input additionality’ and ‘development additionality’. Financial additionality 
would then refer to an investment that a private sector partner would not have made without donor 
support (Heinrich 2013, p.14). Development additionality would refer to the development 
outcomes that could not have been achieved without working in partnership. Heinrich (2013, p. 14) 
suggests that the latter can be conceptualized in two ways. The first is the extent to which donor 
support has enhanced the scope, scale, and speed of a project or brought about changes in long-
term business strategies—what she refers to as behavioural additionality. The second is output or 
outcome additionality, which refers to the results achieved by a partnership that could only have 
been achieved with donor support (Heinrich 2013, p.14; see also Kindornay and Reilly-King 2013, 
33). Donors differ in the attention they pay to additionality conditions, and often provide only 
limited information on how they understand, assess and enforce the additionality of private sector 
related development activities. Development actors tend to focus on demanding additional 
development impact in a broad sense, such as contributions to economic growth and the 
improvement of living standards. Few development actors focus on financial additionality (where a 
specific investment or contribution of the private sector actor would not have happened with the 
involvement of the development actor). Even if requirements of additionality are strong, the 
question remains how to evaluate and monitor additionality, as it involves comparing the actual 
situation with the counter factual.  
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This is illustrated by the conclusions of an evaluation of EU blending in the period 2007-2013. The 
EU Court of Auditors concluded that ‘the need for a grant to enable the loan to be contracted was 
demonstrated for only half of the projects examined’. It adds that ‘there were indications that the 
investments would also have been made without the grant’. The report also claims that ‘(...) the 
Commission’s review of grant applications was based on incomplete information and has not 
focused enough on the added value of grants’. With such conclusions, the Court in fact stated that 
the EU, the biggest proponent and user of blending in development cooperation, has failed to 
ensure the additionality of the private resources mobilized by public funds. Yet, additionality is a 
considered a crucial requirement to guard that development relevance of the public funds used in 
blending. 
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4 |  Belgian development cooperation10 and the 
private sector agenda 
4.1 Policy framework 
Currently, a combination of policy documents sets the framework for the Belgian Development 
Cooperation and its relation to the private sector. Key documents include the Law concerning the 
Belgian Development Cooperation of 19 March 2013, the Law concerning the Belgian Investment 
Company for Developing Countries (BIO) of 20 January 2014, the Law concerning the Belgian 
Development Agency (BTC) of 20 January 2014 and the Strategy Note on the Local Private Sector 
(2014). In these documents there is no explicit recognition of the conceptual distinction between 
private sector in development and private sector development on the one hand, and private sector 
for development and engaging the private sector on the other hand (see section 2.2). A screening of 
their content shows that these documents all convey a strong focus on private sector development 
and hold little to no references to engaging the private sector for development. Also considered as 
relevant are the Strategy Note on the Belgian Development Cooperation in the Middle Income 
Countries (2013), the Strategy Note on Fragile Situations (2013), the Strategy Note on Trade for 
Aid, and the Strategy Note for the Agricultural Sector (2010). Any references to the private sector 
in these documents are, again, related to private sector development.  
Except in relation to private sector development, the screened policy documents do not provide 
guidelines on interactions of development actors with the private sector nor discuss the Belgian 
position on engaging the private sector for development. This is an interesting observation in its 
own right. There is no doubt that the private sector, in different shapes and sizes, is an important 
player in, i.a., the agricultural sector, the health sector or the educational sector in many developing 
countries. Consequently, development actors active in these domains unavoidably interact with the 
private sector. The policy framework clearly emphasize objectives such as fair, inclusive and 
sustainable economic growth, decent work, human rights, or the fight against corruption, but does 
not give clear indications on what such objectives and principles mean for interactions with 
business.  
4.2 Actors, institutional set-up & instruments 
The Strategy Note on the Local Private Sector (2014) stipulates that the Belgian development 
cooperation, in pursuit of its strategy to support local private sector in developing countries, can 
appeal to several actors that ‘have specialized in support to the private sector’ (The Belgian 
Development Cooperation, 2014, p. 13). These are: the Belgian Investment Company for 
Developing Countries (BIO), the bilateral cooperation executed by BTC, its Trade Development 
Centre (TDC), and some NGOs. It also identifies additional actors that ‘due to the nature of their 
mandate are, directly or indirectly, involved in the development of local private sector’: Finexpo, 
Credendo/Delcredere, regions and communities and the Federal Public Service of Finance (The 
Belgian Development Cooperation, 2014, p. 17). Other policy documents and interviews with 
 
10  Obviously the role of the private sector in development is an issue that cuts across different policy domains, not in the least those of 
foreign affairs, foreign trade and finance. An exhaustive screening of policy documents in all the relevant domains was outside the 
scope of this study, but the following sections do take into account some of the relevant actors or developments in these domains. 
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different Belgian development officials help to complete the picture of actors that somehow play a 
bridging role between development cooperation and private sector and contribute to clarifying the 
different roles of and connections between the actors that have direct relations with the private 
sector within a broader development objective. The overall picture has been visualized in an actor 
map (see figure 4.1).  
Figure 4.1 Belgian actors involved in private sector in development 
 
The figure above includes the different actors that have been identified as relevant (in policy 
documents or expert interviews) in existing interactions between official development cooperation 
and private sector. It is not limited to actors inside the competence of Development Cooperation, 
but the focus is on actors that (can) play a role in direct and indirect bilateral cooperation. As a 
consequence only key multilateral actors have been included. The map distinguishes between policy 
actors and executive actors11 with the latter being highlighted (cfr. the filled boxes). The map also 
indicates the type of relation actors have with each other: in some cases policy actors directly 
manage an executive actor, whereas in other cases the latter operate more independently. Some 
actors maintain open communication lines, whereas others do not. As the maps shows, Belgian 
development cooperation counts a rather limited number of actors that have activities related to the 
private sector. The following section discusses the lead actors in more detail.  
 
The table below (table 4.1) illustrates the type of activities and the scale of the respective budgets 
that some actors (in the competence of Development Cooperation) deploy in their interaction with 
the private sector.  
 
11 The executive actors have the most direct interaction with the private sector and private sector engagement is also an explicit part 
of their mandate, whereas policy actors are more involved in policy making and follow-up of policy implementation. Obviously the 
two can overlap.  
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Table 4.1 Overview of actors and budgets 
Actor Type of activities Budget Budget 
period 
 Trade Development Centre 
(TDC) 
- Improve access to markets 
- Awareness raising 
- Capacity building  
13,000,000 2014-2017 
Belgian Investment Corporation 
(BIO) 
- Capacity building 
- Improve access to finance 
210,000,000 + 
10,000,000 
2014-2018 
Allocation ‘Entrepreneurship for 
Development’ (support to NGOs 
Agricord and Ex-change) 
- Capacity building through peer-to-
peer approach 
6,000,000 2015-2017 
NGAs - Different activities (from capacity 
building to lobby and advocacy) 
depending on the actor and the 
program 
Programmafinanciering 2014-2016 
4.2.1 Directorate General Development Cooperation 
The central actor at the policy level is de Directorate General Development Cooperation (DGD), 
situated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation. DGD 
delegates the implementation of the development policy to several other actors: the Belgian 
Development Agency (BTC), the Belgian Investment Company (BIO), different non-governmental 
actors (such as NGOs and trade unions) and several multilateral institutions.  
DGD coordinates several thematic platforms - e.g. on agriculture, food security or health - that 
bring together different stakeholders. Although the role of the private sector in these domains is at 
times subject of discussion, it is not a standing item on the agenda of these platforms. The strategy 
note on the private sector announced the establishment of such a platform on ‘entrepreneurship for 
development’ in which representatives of public, private, and non-governmental organizations as 
well as advisory councils and representatives of the private sector could participate. However, until 
now the platform has not been launched. 
Within DGD, the Direction Inclusive Growth (D2.2) is the sole department that has inclusive 
growth and the private sector in developing countries as focal points. Its tasks are to maintain 
necessary in-house expertise on the topic, to provide input to and monitor the activities of BTC 
and BIO (see below) and to manage the partnerships on the budget ‘entrepreneurship for 
development’. The latter supports initiatives that build the capacity of organisations of 
entrepreneurs and of micro, small, and medium sized enterprises (MSMEs) in partner countries of 
the Belgian development cooperation. Currently Ex-Change, an NGO that acts as a matchmaker 
between Belgian experts and capacity challenged enterprises in developing countries, and Agricord, 
a network of non-governmental organisations for development cooperation in the rural sector 
receive support. Additionally D2.2 advises DGD on other partnerships with non-governmental 
actors, it participates in relevant international policy discussions and maintains communication with 
other departments. Its involvement in international policy discussion on mobilizing private 
resources for development is illustrated by its participation in the EU Blending Committee (EU-
BEC). It maintains basic contacts with the Directorates Bilateral Affairs (DGB) and European 
Affairs (DGE), which both have competences related to the role of private sector in international 
cooperation: the latter is involved in the follow-up of the aid for trade agenda at the European 
level, whereas the first is responsible for Belgian economic diplomacy. Direction D2.2 has a 
capacity of 1,5 FTE to do these tasks.  
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DGD also steers the indirect development cooperation, through partnership programs with non-
governmental actors, such as trade unions and NGOs.  
Some of the Belgian multilateral development cooperation also has a clear private sector linkage. 
Belgium is shareholder to the World Bank and with 15.4% of the total DGD budget in 2013 the 
World Bank is (budget wise) the most important multilateral partner of Belgian development 
cooperation.12 Besides debt relief operations of the HIPC and the MDR, the Belgian mandatory 
contributions to the World Bank also finance the International Development Association (IDA) 
and are used for capital increases of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). All three IDA, IBRD and especially IFC 
have a private sector development agenda.13 In fact the IFC’s prime goal is private sector 
development in developing countries, through the provision of loans and advice and the 
participation in equity. Or, as their website states: “IFC blends investment with advice and resource 
mobilization to help the private sector advance development”. Belgian support to other multilateral 
organization, such as for example the International Labour Organisation (ILO), and UN agencies as 
IFAD (International Fund for Agricultural Development) and FAO can also have a strong private 
sector component, for example when looking into increasing agricultural production or impacting 
on labour conditions, but is arguably less oriented at mobilizing private (financial) resources for 
development.  
On the European level the European Development Fund (EDF) is a relevant channel to take into 
account when considering private sector engagement in development cooperation. The EDF is 
financed by direct contributions from EU Member States and is the main instrument for European 
development cooperation with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states. The EDF makes 
use of grants, venture capital and loans to the private sector to promote economic, social and 
human development and regional cooperation. One of the funding windows of the EDF is the EU 
Energy Facility. It aims to foster sustainable access to energy and can use co-financing with private 
players to do so. Also related is the Belgian participation in the EU Africa Infrastructure Fund, 
established by the EDF. Since its contribution of 1 million EUR in 2008, Belgium remains involved 
in the management of the portfolio. Currently an important attention point on the EU-level is the 
Belgian participation in the EU Platform for Blending and External Cooperation (EU-BEC). This 
priority is in line with the strong emphasis on blending as the EU’s main instrument to mobilise 
private sector resources for development (Interview Reis Condé, January 2015). Currently the focus 
in the EU-BEC platform lies on policy development on blending, with the securing the underlying 
objective of poverty reduction and with the governance of the EU blending facilities high on the 
agenda.  
 
Finally, also on the radar should be the fervently searched after synergy between the agendas of 
climate change mitigation and adaptation on the one hand and private sector engagement on the 
other. Many instruments that fund climate change mitigation and adaptation in developing 
countries14 attempt to leverage additional private finance or to facilitate private development and 
 
12 Because of the gradual decrease of the voluntary Belgian contributions to the World Bank, currently only one additional program is 
financed on the budget of development cooperation: Global Partnership for Education (GPE). 
13 IDA is the institution that provides guarantees, advice, concessional loans and grants to LICs. Although a less prominently part of its 
core mission, private sector development is also firmly on its agenda. The IDA complements the IBRD, the original self-sustaining 
lending arm of the World Bank. The IBRD provides loans and advice to middle-income and credit-worthy poor countries. IFC, a 
member of the World Bank Group, is the largest global development institution focused exclusively on the private sector in 
developing countries. It finances and provides advice for private sector ventures and projects in developing countries in 
partnership with 
14 The DGD mainly contributes to the Global Environment Facility’s climate funds, the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special 
Climate Change Fund. In 2013, a contribution was also made to a special adaptation programme for small farmers organised by 
the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). 
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implementation of projects contributing to low-carbon development. For example the Green 
Climate Fund, to which the federal government contributed 50 million Euro from the budget for 
development cooperation, also has a Private Sector Facility. A full account of the relevant resources 
flows and policy instruments mobilizing them is beyond the scope of this paper. However, in the 
framework of BeFinD HIVA also conducts research on climate related development flows. 
4.2.2 Belgian Development Agency (BTC/CTB) and its Trade Development Centre 
(TDC) 
A key implementing actor is the Belgian Development Agency (BTC/CTB). BTC was established 
in 1999 and is responsible for the execution of the direct, bilateral cooperation. Its establishment, 
mandate and management are stipulated in the law of 21 December 1998, subsequently revised in 
2002, 2004 and 201415. Originally it had a relatively broad mandate with regard to its interaction 
with the private sector covered a.o. by its competence of implementing ‘financial cooperation’ with 
Belgian partner countries, which included participation in venture capital of development banks and 
private enterprises (Law of 21 December 1998, Art 2, 17° and Art. 5, § 2, 3°; Parl.St. Kamer 2000-
2001, nr. 1349/1, p. 31). However, with the establishment of the Belgian development bank, BIO 
Invest, (see below) in 2001, the mandate of BTC regarding the private sector has been revised 
(Parl.St. Kamer 2000-2001, nr. 1349/1, p. 31).  
Both in 2001 and 2013 when the laws on BIO16 were on the drafting table, Belgian policy makers 
were asked by the Council of State to clarify the difference between the two public corporations 
(BTC and BIO) that both have a mandate to work with the private sector in developing countries17. 
In response, the law of 3 November 2001 establishing BIO differentiated the mandates of BTC and 
BIO more clearly by emphasizing that BIO’s support to the private sector would be in line with 
market conditions and would be profit-seeking. BTC’s activities did not need to be market conform 
and would not be aimed at financial return. It was added that BTC’s support to the private sector in 
developing countries would entail “more specifically technical assistance and knowledge transfer” 
whereas it previously also covered participations in venture capital and BTC was restricted from 
deploying activities that fall within the scope of BIO (Parl.St. Kamer 2000-2001, nr. 1349/1, p. 31; 
Parl. St. Kamer 2013-2014, nr.3062/01, pp.8-9). With the revision of the law on BIO in 2013, BIO 
was given de mandate to provide grants for technical assistance and feasibility studies. This equalled 
the provision of financial support below market conditions and the deployment of activities that 
would not be profitable and would present as expenses on the Belgian budget. The issue of 
duplication between BIO and BTC was raised again, but debuted by limiting BIOs support to only 
those companies that are either already in BIO’s portfolio or that are prospective beneficiaries, and 
by specifying that the support of maximum 100,000 EUR should by matched by the beneficiary 
(Law of 20 January 2014). In summary, the legal framework attempts to provide a strict task 
division between BTC and BIO, which is also embedded in the type of budget both organisations 
receive18.  
 
15 21 DECEMBER 1998. - Wet tot oprichting van de “Belgische Technische Coöperatie” in de vorm van een vennootschap van publiek 
recht., 1998 
16  
17 More specifically, the Council of State did not understand the interest of “making two public corporations with competences 
regarding development cooperation each other’s competitor (…)” (Parl.St. Kamer 2000-2001, nr. 1349/1, p. 23, my translation). For 
more information consult the Advices of the Council of State 31.222/4 and 53.964/2/V attached to the respective bills: Wetsontwerp 
tot oprichting van de Belgische Investeringsmaatschappij voor Ontwikkelingslanden, 2001, pp. 21–26, Wetsontwerp tot wijziging van 
de wet van 3 november 2001 tot oprichting van de Belgische Investeringsmaatschappij voor Ontwikkelingslanden en tot wijziging 
van de wet van 21 december 1998 tot oprichting van de “Belgische Technische Coöperatie” in de vorm van een vennootschap 
van publiek recht, 2013, pp. 26–39. (  
18 More specifically, BIO functions with a budget with economic code 8, which means it does not present as expenses for the Belgian 
state. BTC on the other hand, works on a budget ‘code 5’, which does feature as expense on the development cooperation 
budget. In case certain activities of BIO would not be profitable, they would fall with this category too, and would therefore weigh 
on the development cooperation budget. 
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However, a question to be raised is whether, in its current practice, BTC makes full use of its legal 
mandate to work on and with the private sector. The role of the BTC as the main implementer of 
the government development cooperation and of its Trade Development Centre (see further) in 
supporting private sector development through technical assistance and knowledge transfer are well 
established. The current legal framework (the law of 21 December 1998 on the establishment of 
BTC revised in 2014) stipulates at least four additional points: Firstly, BTC is also19 authorised to 
conduct programs for financial cooperation, debt management and trade promotion (Art.5, §2, 3° 
and Art.6, §1, 5°). Secondly, BTC is allowed to close agreements with different types of institutions 
or organisations, including private ones, for the provision of subsidies if these organisations are not 
profit-seeking (Art.8). Thirdly, BTC is allowed to participate in private initiatives if they do not fall 
within the mandate of BIO (Art. 9). Fourthly, the minister can ask BTC to take on additional tasks 
on top of what has been stipulated in the ongoing contract (Art. 6). The current mandates and 
descriptions of tasks of BIO and BTC suggest that BTC, and only BTC, is authorised to do non-
profitable investments in the local private sector. This could be an interesting option to explore, 
because BIO’s obligation to remain profitable, limits its possibilities to support financial 
intermediaries and investment funds that target micro- and small enterprises, because of the 
overhead costs and the high risks. If requested, BTC could in theory participate in (indirect) 
financing of microenterprises.  
At the moment however BTCs activities remain focused on governmental development 
cooperation, supporting private sector development and promotion of sustainable trade. Most of 
the tasks regarding the private sector have been clustered in a specialised program: the Trade for 
Development Centre (TDC). According to the current 2014-2017 agreement, the specific 
objective of the TDC is to improve the access to markets for (organisations of) producers based in 
one of the partner countries, and to promote sustainable trade. It will in particular do so by building 
the capacity of (organisations of) MSMEs. To achieve this it provides financial and technical 
assistance to MSMEs in developing countries and it mounts awareness raising campaigns on 
sustainable trade targeting Belgian public, companies and policy makers. It will also support DGD 
as well as the geographical desks within BTC, on their approaches to or interactions with the 
private sector in partner countries.  
Although the TDC is BTC’s specialised unit on private sector for development, other activities of 
BTC also have linkages with private sector. BTC contributes to TradeMark East Africa, a not-for-
profit company that supports the growth of trade - both regional and international - in East Africa. 
TradeMark East Africa (TMEA) is focused on ensuring gains from trade result in tangible gains for 
East Africans. BTC also contributes to the EAC Partnership Fund, a basket fund mechanism with 
annual contributions from the development partners that is used to support projects and 
programmes that are geared towards regional integration. BTC provided technical support and 
expertise to the Vietnamese government for setting up a Green Growth Strategy Facility (GGS 
Facility), aimed at supporting green growth in Vietnam.  
4.2.3 The Belgian Investment Company, BIO Invest 
Second heavy weight is the Belgian Investment Company, BIO. BIO was established in 2001 with a 
start capital of 4,957,873 EUR, of which 50% of the shares were in the hands of the Belgian state 
and 50% in the hands of the Belgian Cooperation International Investment (BMI). However, in 
view of the limited prospect for synergies between BMI’s and BIO’s investment approaches, BMI 
 
19  Next to the implementation of programs and projects of the governmental cooperation, and of actions to support the local private 
sector in partner countries through technical assistance and knowledge transfer. 
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withdrew. End of 2013 the Belgian state became sole owner of BIO, of which the total capital at 
that moment amounted to 600 million EUR (bio, 2014; Federale Overheidsdienst Buitenlandse 
Zaken, 2014). Combined with a CSO campaign questioning the role of BIO (Van de Poel, 2011), 
this set the scene for an important reform.  It was aimed at improving the development relevance 
of BIOs activities as well as their complementarity with the other activities of the Belgian 
development cooperation, and in particular those of BTC .  
BIOs main goal is to support private sector development in developing countries, with the 
underlying objective of creating sustainable employment that is in line with the fundamental social 
rights as stipulated by the International Labour Organisation. Its original mandate upon 
establishment in 2001 was to invest in the development of companies seated in developing 
countries in pursuit of the economic and social progress in those countries (law of 3 November 
2001 on BIO, Art.3, §1). The reform in 2014 rephrased and focused the mandate, directing BIO to 
investments in the development of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises and enterprises in 
the social economy in developing countries while ensuring sufficient return on investment. BIO is 
also asked to invest in energy projects and projects contributing to climate change mitigation in 
developing countries, and in basic service providers in developing countries (law of 20 January 
2014, Art.4). To do so, BIO can use medium and long term loans, participation in equity, 
guarantees, and hybrid financial instruments.  
However, there are some important conditions. First of all, the investments need to be profitable. 
Following the recent reform, BIO is supervised by the Institute of National Accounts and has to 
report on its portfolio several times a year (in theory this is now monthly instead of yearly). This 
also means that it has to account for the profitability of its individual investments (and no longer of 
its average portfolio). Secondly, all investments have to be untied. Thirdly, each intervention needs 
to be in line with criteria regarding environment, social rights, labour conditions and additionality.  
BIOs current activities follow 4 main tracks: indirect finance to micro and small enterprises by 
supporting financial institutions that target MSEs, participation in investment funds that invest in 
equity of SMEs, financing basic infrastructure, and directly providing finance to medium sized 
enterprises (mostly loans). The question is raised that the current requirement for profitability 
pushes BIO to be risk averse: if an investment does not meet the profitability requirements it would 
unexpectedly fall on the development cooperation budget.  
4.2.4 Finexpo 
FINEXPO was created by Royal Decree of 30 May 1974 ‘to reinforce the Belgian instruments for 
financial support to export’. FINEXPO is an inter-ministerial advisory committee managed by the 
Directorate Financial Support to Export (B2) within the Federal Service Foreign Affairs, Foreign 
Trade and Development Cooperation, and by the Administration for International and European 
Financial Affairs of the Federal Public Service for Finance. Its mission is to support the export of 
Belgian capital goods and related services to developing countries ‘taking into account these 
countries’ developing needs and the need for economic, environmental and social sustainability’ 
(Federal Public Service of Finance, 2013, p. 4).  
Finexpo offers Belgian companies who wish to export to developing countries the opportunity to 
apply for State to State loans, grants, interest indemnification (with grant), interest indemnification 
(without grant) and interest stabilization. Of these 5 instruments, 4 could be registered as ODA 
(except interest stabilization). All should be considered as ‘tied aid’ except for the provision of state 
to state loans to Least Developed Countries and Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) that, in 
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line with OECD agreements, has to be untied. The untied support to HIPC is limited to projects in 
the sectors of rural electrification, public transport, water, dredging, health, education and R&D. 
Finexpo’s intervention options thus depend on the type of country the export is targeting, but 
otherwise Finexpo’s geographical scope is not restricted (it can operate in all non-European 
countries). For both the tied and the untied component, only non-commercially viable projects are 
eligible. In some ways these instruments have a blending component, as they combine loan with 
grants. However, the current use of the term blending emphasizes the strategic use of the grant 
element to leverage additional finance as a complement to development funds. When combining 
grants and loans, Finexpo does not necessarily aim for this multiplier effect (the project has to be 
non-commercially viable) (Federale Overheidsdienst Financiën, 2013; Federal Public Service of 
Finance, 2013). 
In 2010 an external evaluation of Finexpo’s ODA related instruments revealed that the absence of a 
broad policy framework was not compensated by an internal strategy. Finexpo was operating 
without clear guidelines to evaluate the trade- and development relevance of project proposals, and 
the development relevance of specific projects was not cross-checked with the development 
strategies of the countries involved. Finexpo mostly relied on the advice of embassies and World 
Bank. Another important critique was that unsustainability of Finexpo’s support: the trade relations 
that were made possible by Finexpo’s support did not allow Belgian companies to permanently 
penetrate the market and continue without Finexpo support. Another important remark of the 
evaluators was that Finexpo’s support in fact benefited a limited number of companies: over a 
period of 10 years, 38 companies benefited from Finexpo support, with 52% of the total budget 
attributed to just 5 companies. 
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Table 4.2 Main Belgian development actors: who uses what instruments to target which private sector? 
Actor Key instruments/approaches Target  
DGD Currently managing relations with development actors 
who work directly on/with private sector 
Belgian development actors 
Financing activities regarding private sector development 
by Agricord and Ex-change 
Belgian stakeholders in private sector related 
development cooperation  
Considering a private sector stakeholder platform but 
limited capacity is an obstacle 
Belgian stakeholders in private sector related 
development cooperation  
Policy development on blending at EU level (EU-BEC) EU blending facilities 
Contributing to European and multilateral development 
institutions with private sector development and private 
sector engagement activities. 
- 
BTC Technical assistance 
Grants  
 
TDC Capacity building 
Assistance to get certification 
Market studies 
Matchmaking 
(Organisations of) small producers 
Awareness raising Belgian private sector 
Government actors 
Broad public 
BIO Medium and long term financing in the form of: 
Loans  
Participation in equity 
Guarantees 
Non-reimbursable subsidies for technical assistance 
Regional or local intermediary structures 
(microfinance institutions, commercial banks, non-
bank financial institutions, and investment 
companies and funds) that support MSMEs and 
microfinance institutions 
MSMEs and large companies with a local foothold 
in LDCs and MICs 
Medium and long term funding in the form of: 
Loans  
Equity 
Quasi-equity 
Guarantees 
Private infrastructure projects, energy project, 
climate mitigation projects, basic service providers 
Finexpo State to state loans (tied) 
Grants 
Interest indemnification (with or without grant) 
Belgian exporters 
Importers in developing countries 
Banks involved in the deals 
State to state loans (untied) HIPCs 
NGA Private sector development  
Esp. capacity building 
local SMEs and smallholder farmers 
Awareness raising 
Capacity building on development impact and 
sustainability of business practices 
Watchdog business practices 
Lobby and advocacy 
Belgian private sector, government, broader public 
4.3 Analysis 
Belgian development actors are doing PSD with an occasional touch of PS4D. The existing policy 
framework, the mandates of the different development actors, and the general and specific 
objectives of different instruments show a clear focus on private sector development, in policy and 
practice. However, in some instances development actors are engaging the private sector for 
development. A first example is DGD’s support to NGOs that match Belgian entrepreneurs with 
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capacity constrained SMEs in development countries (on the budget ‘entrepreneurship for 
development’). Here the Belgian private sector is approached as provider of expertise, while the 
local private sector is the beneficiary of capacity building. A second example of PS4D are all 
instances where Belgian development actors are investing in funds that also aim to attract private 
financiers, such as the EU African Infrastructure Fund, or TradeMark East Africa. The grant 
support by donor agencies is used to make the fund more attracting to private funders. When these 
funds are used for PSD, the private sector in developing countries acts as the beneficiary of 
financial support, often in combination with capacity building and sometimes in combination with 
efforts to build a more enabling environment. The international private sector acts in such instances 
as providers of finance. A third example, is TDC’s awareness raising on sustainable development, 
where the Belgian private sector is considered a target (that can be pushed to change its 
procurement practices), and where Belgian and local private sector are also approached as 
reformers, by looking for ways to introduce fairer and more sustainable products to the market. 
However, across the board the mapping revealed few instances where private sector is approached 
in the role of reformer, developer or participant in policy dialogue. 
A second set of observations is related to the institutional set-up and how it allows for a good 
alignment of the current work on private sector amongst different actors. Firstly, the current 
practice20 limits BTC’s reach to partner countries only, to a maximum of three sectors in each 
country, and to grants and technical assistance as key tools. At the same time Finexpo can operate 
in much more developing countries and sectors, and it can provide loans. The question is whether 
this task division allows the most appropriate actor to intervene with the most appropriate tool. 
The example of the BTC grant to the Moroccan government for a water conservation scheme, 
while Finexpo provides an untied loan to Niger for the improvement of access to drinking water 
suggests otherwise. One could argue that a grant would be more suited in a HIPC country, while a 
loan could also work in Morocco.  
A similar issue may hinder an ideal specialization of BTC and BIO. When in 2014 the management 
contracts of the two institutions were due, the drafting happened separately from each other. No 
joint sessions were held to ensure complementarity and avoid duplication. This demonstrates the 
limited awareness of the need to consider each actor as a part of a bigger institutional landscape. Its 
current mandate pushes BIO to ensure a considerable return on investment. This may force BIO 
toward more risk adverse investment behaviour, avoiding direct involvement and investments in 
the more risky micro- and small enterprises. In theory BTC could bridge this gap, as contrary to 
BIO it can spend money without needing a return on investment, but its current contract doesn’t 
give it a strong mandate to go beyond grants and technical assistance and do investments. Charging 
BTC with the task to participate in specialized funds that target the risky segment of micro- and 
small entrepreneurs, if necessary supported by BIOs expertise, could help Belgian development 
cooperation reach a group that is now hard to target.  
 
20 Although the provisions in the law of 21 December 1998 revised in 2014 suggest room for manoeuvre in this regard, in particular in 
view of article 6 that offers the possibility to extend the management contract between BTC and the Belgian State to include 
additional tasks.  
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5 |  Donor strategies: key dividing lines 
5.1 Three donors in the spotlight 
To provide a comparative perspective, the study looks into the policies and practices on mobilizing 
private resources for development of three OECD-DAC donors: The United Kingdom (UK), the 
Netherlands, and Switzerland. This selection was based on the literature review that indicated that 
both the UK and the Netherlands were frontrunners with regard to mobilizing private resources for 
development. In the past 5 years they have both made strong policy statements and implemented 
new policies and instruments to strengthen the ties with the private sector. However, the rationale 
and context of this policy demarche in both countries seems to be very different. Switzerland was 
selected as a case because of its comparability with Belgium, it also being a relatively small donor 
(total ODA in 2013 3.2 billion USD) and in the process of developing its development policy and 
practices with regard to the role of the private sector in development. The EU has also been 
touched on in this study because of its strong stake in blending. 
The collected information reveals that there are some common issues that these donors had (or 
have) to deal with when tackling the debate on private sector for development, and that their 
responses differ. Firstly, the forces and rationale driving a reconsideration of the role of the private 
sector in the development cooperation vary. How does this affect the direction of future policy? 
Secondly, the institutional set-ups for interaction between development cooperation and private 
sector differ. How does this determine the possibilities and constraints for policy formulation on 
private sector for development? Thirdly, specific thematic and operational choices are made. What 
issues have come up in the implementation of these different choices? This section describes how 
these issues have so far played out in The Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland.  
5.2 Issue 1: driving forces and rationale 
5.2.1 The Netherlands 
The development of its private sector component has been a dominant feature of the Dutch 
development cooperation of the past 5 years. In 2010 a critical report by the Dutch Scientific 
Council to the Government (WRR) recommended a.o. that Dutch development aid should focus 
more on economic growth instead of on investment in education and health. Together with the 
push for austerity measures and changes in the government, this set the scene for a heated political 
as well as public debate on development cooperation (Spitz, Muskens, & van Ewijk, 2013). What 
followed were two rounds of deep budget cuts (in 2010 and again in 2012) and a fundamental 
review of the privileged partners in official development cooperation. The extensive financing of 
Dutch development NGOs was radically cut, and more money was earmarked for cooperation with 
the private sector (Zijlstra, 2010).  
This shift in Dutch development cooperation was not a sterile budgetary one: it was accompanied 
by a fundamental reformulation of the underlying rationale of development cooperation. The 
Netherlands defined economic growth in developing countries as well as the promotion of Dutch 
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commercial interests as the main objectives of its development cooperation. The Dutch 
government stresses national interest, the need for a win-win and the success of the Dutch 
companies abroad as guiding principles of its development cooperation and embraced the 
alignment of development cooperation with foreign trade and national commercial interests 
(Government of the Netherlands, n.d.; Ploumen, 2013). Taking into account the whole history of 
Dutch development cooperation, this policy shift is less deviant than may seem at first sight: from 
the 70s onwards human rights and the struggle against global inequality gained importance in the 
Dutch development policy, but in fact commercial interests have been leitmotif in Dutch 
development cooperation since its beginning, more so than geo-political interests (Spitz et al., 2013). 
Still, the past five years can be considered as tumultuous for development cooperation: for the first 
time since the 70s did the ODA budget fall below the 0.7%, while simultaneously economic self-
interest has moved to the forefront of development policy discourse. 
This stance of the Dutch development cooperation does not match well with the international 
efforts to untie aid. In its 2011 peer review, the OECD-DAC made the recommendation that 
development objectives should not be ‘confused with the promotion of Dutch commercial 
interests’ (OECD, 2011). At the same time, the policy shift illustrates a growing consensus that the 
current ODA definition is outdated. Although the Netherlands has untied its ODA beyond the 
requirements of the OECD-DAC recommendation regarding tied aid, this position is now being 
reconsidered. This is illustrated by the strong opposition of current Minister for Foreign Trade and 
Development Cooperation, Liliane Ploumen, against a motion to confirm the Dutch abstinence of 
tied aid: ‘I have to advise against this motion on tied aid. Combining aid and trade demands new 
solutions that fit with this new era’. The House of Representatives, including most left-wing parties, 
voted against the motion (Brouwers, 2014).  
5.2.2 The United Kingdom 
The British Department for International Development (DFID) has always worked with and on the 
private sector, but initially in a fragmented and ad hoc manner. Throughout the first decade of this 
millennium this tradition was scaled up gradually with UK’s lead participation in the Private 
Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG), a participation in several global funds working with 
private sector and several ‘business alliances’ to foster corporate social responsibility and inclusive 
business. However, as of 2010 the private sector really shifted to the top of the British development 
agenda (Interview DfID, January 2015). Unlike the case of the Netherlands, this demarche did not 
happen in the context of a heated public debate, or in the context of ODA budget cuts. On the 
contrary, committed to meeting the target of 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) to development 
cooperation annually, the UK government ‘ring-fenced’ aid spending from any cuts. In contrast to a 
real-terms reduction in total public expenditure of 11.5% between 2010-11 and 2014-15, 
development aid expenditures increased by 40%. It is in this context of a budget increase that 
DfID’s mandate and institutional structure to work with and on the private sector have been 
strengthened. Similar to the Dutch case, the development agenda was clearly broadened from 
working on private sector development, to working with the private sector. Interestingly, in the case 
of the UK the promotion of national interest and strengthening the position of British 
entrepreneurs abroad didn’t and still doesn’t feature prominently in the policy discourse. Instead, 
developing the local private sector and engaging the business community in development are at the 
core. The UK too has untied its ODA beyond the requirements of the OECD-DAC 
recommendation regarding tied aid. Tied aid is illegal in the UK by virtue of the International 
Development Act, which came into force on 17 June 2002. Since creating opportunities for UK 
businesses wasn’t the angle of the policy shift, this has not been challenged, although DFID does 
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do efforts to make UK SMEs aware of procurement opportunities in developing countries 
(Interview DfID, January 2015). 
5.2.3 Switzerland 
Reflection and policy development on the role of the private sector in Swiss development 
cooperation built progressively since 2009. Although Swiss economic growth has been dampened 
by the financial crisis and the high Swiss franc delays its recovery, Swiss economy is doing relatively 
well. This, and the 2011 decision to proceed towards an ODA/GNI ratio of 0.5% by 2015 show 
that the rise of the private sector in development policy is not so much inspired by a context of 
austerity measures and an ODA budget under pressure. Instead, a 2006 independent evaluation of 
SDC’s partnership approach, the follow-up of the 2009 OECD peer review, profound institutional 
reforms in the development cooperation structures between 2009 and 2012, and the formulation of 
the first single comprehensive strategy for development cooperation in 2012 have been the main 
factors that enabled and stimulated the ongoing policy shift. A priority objective of the 2013-2016 
Message on Development Cooperation is to develop more strategic partnerships with the private 
sector. The latest OECD peer review commends the progress made in this domain but also 
encourages the operationalization of this objective, through the development of the right tools and 
instruments for effective partnerships with the private sector. Particular attention should be paid on 
the catalytic use of ODA to attract other forms of development finance. Both Swiss development 
agencies - SDC and SECO - are in the process of doing so, drawing on their existing experience in 
working with the private sector as well as on academic input and stakeholder dialogues. Like UK 
and the Netherlands, Switzerland untied its aid beyond the requirements of the OECD-DAC 
recommendation. In 2012 its untied aid stood at 96%. However, SDC officials do feel an increased 
demand to develop the links between development cooperation and Swiss companies. SECO also 
does not shy away from working with Swiss private sector. Its direct partnerships with Swiss firms 
are mainly at partner-country level and aimed at increasing the export capacities of local firms for 
sustainable trade. It also uses matching funds to mobilize the expertise of Swiss SMEs (SECO, 
2013). 
5.2.4 The European Union 
The rise of the private sector in European development policy is illustrated by the increased focus 
on private sector in subsequent policy reforms: The 2011 Agenda for Change made inclusive and 
sustainable growth a main priority and put innovative financing and blending on the agenda. The 
2013 evaluation of the EU’s private sector development (PSD) activities led to the strong 
reconfirmation of the EUs role as important donor in this area.21 The 2014 EU Commission 
Communication on ‘A Stronger Role of the Private Sector in Achieving Inclusive and Sustainable 
Growth in Developing Countries’ put the private sector at the forefront of international 
development in EU partner countries and proposed 12 actions to address the role of the private 
sector in development (European Commission, 2014). The Council Conclusions of December 2014 
confirmed this position and further explored ways of working with the private sector in order to 
harness its expertise and resources for inclusive and sustainable development (Council of the 
European Union, 2014). This policy build-up illustrates how the private sector related development 
work of the EU has expanded to different fields: private sector development, private sector 
engagement, private sector resource mobilization, with blending being one of the eye catchers in 
the EU toolkit. Member states have committed to this expanding private sector agenda but the 
policy shift is not welcomed uniformly. NGOs as well as research institutes have voiced their 
 
21  The commission has spent about €350m (£284m) a year supporting private sector development over the past decade. 
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concern. They point out the high risk of profit-making motives outweighing poverty reduction 
objectives when using public resources or ‘leverage’ private finance. They are also worried about 
the commission decision to identify social services as an opportunity for private sector engagement 
(Eurodad, 2014a; Eurodad & CRBM, 2011).  
5.2.5 Convergence and divergence 
In several OECD-DAC donor countries private sector is rising on the development policy agenda. 
This is not just the case in the UK, The Netherlands, Switzerland or the EU. Across the board 
donors stress the crucial role of private sector in global sustainable development, and many of them 
are exploring the implications for development cooperation policy. However, the context in which 
these policy (re)formulations can differ dramatically, depending on historical, budgetary and 
political factors and the windows of opportunity they create. 
5.3 Institutional set-up 
5.3.1 The Netherlands  
Total ODA budget (estimate for 2015): 3.7 billion euro; Budget for ‘sustainable trade and investment’ 
(estimate for 2015): 523,7 million euro of which 267,9 million euro is ODA; Main executing actors: Netherlands 
Development Finance Company (FMO), Netherlands Enterprise Agency (RVO) and Embassies (Ministerie 
Buitenlandse Zaken, 2014). 
The gravitation of Dutch development policy towards win-win and economic self-interest has also 
had repercussions for the institution set-up in development cooperation. Since 2012 foreign trade 
and development cooperation fall within the competence of one and the same cabinet-level post 
(Minister of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation), imbedded in the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs. The Directorate-General for International Cooperation (DGIS) is responsible for 
development cooperation policy, its coordination, implementation, and funding. It has a separate 
Department on Sustainable Economic Development (DDE) that seeks to promote sustainable 
economic growth and improve income and employment opportunities in the partner countries. 
Next to its work on improving an enabling business climate, it also uses trade and investment 
instruments to stimulate business. This work is mainly outsourced to two organizations: the 
Netherlands Development Finance Company (FMO) and Netherlands Enterprise Agency (RVO). 
Between them the two organizations cover a wide range of facilities that appeal to the role of the 
private sector in development cooperation.  
51 
 
CHAPTER 5 | DONOR STRATEGIES: KEY DIVIDING LINES  
Figure 5.1 Overview of main Dutch actors and funds involved in PSD and PSE 
 
 
* The filled boxed show the implementing actors.  
FMO, the Dutch development bank, finances businesses, projects and financial institutions in 
developing and emerging markets, with the aim of supporting sustainable private sector 
development. FMO’s strong profile allows us to invest in higher risk markets, either with our own 
capital or on behalf of the Dutch Government. FMO manages several funds for the Dutch 
Government, which they invest in higher-risk projects. These government funds cover the financial 
risks that FMO is not able to tolerate alone, and allows FMO to support projects with a high risk 
profile that promise substantial development impact. MASSIF funds financial institutions that can 
stimulate the development of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) in developing 
countries. Access to Energy Fund (AEF) funds private sector projects that aim to create sustainable 
access to energy services. The Infrastructure Development Fund provides long-term financing for 
infrastructure projects in low-income countries.  
Netherlands Enterprise Agency (RVO) is part of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The 
organisation has been in existence since 201422 and encourages entrepreneurs in sustainable, 
agrarian, innovative and international business. It helps with grants, finding business partners, 
know-how and compliance with laws and regulations. Not all of its substructures or programs 
feature in the figure X, Amongst its programs and substructures: the Matchmaking Facility (MMF) 
to assist private businesses in emerging markets to establish links with Dutch companies to 
establish business relationships; the Centre for the Promotion of Imports from Developing 
Countries (CBI) that aims to contribute to the economic independence of developing countries by 
helping them sell their products and services in the European Union; the Transition Facility which 
helps Dutch SMEs to establish trade relations with Vietnam, South Africa and Colombia (transition 
countries); and the Dutch Good Growth Fund (DGGF). 
 
22  RVO came into existence after a merger between NL Agency and the Dienst Regelingen.  
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With the DGGF, operational since only July 2014, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs aims to support 
Dutch and local businesses in emerging markets and developing countries. It will do so by 
providing export and investment financing through 3 tracks: (1) financing investments in Dutch 
SMEs in emerging markets and developing countries; (2) financing local SMEs in emerging markets 
and developing countries, via intermediary funds; (3) financing/insuring exports that are relevant 
for development from Dutch SMEs to emerging markets and developing countries. The support is 
given as loans and/or guarantees and not grants. Applicants have to argue activities the 
development relevance of their activities, measured in local employment creation, improvement of 
the local productive capacity and knowledge transfer. They also have to prove that they respect 
social and ecological sustainability dimensions. 
Important to note is the role of The Netherlands-African Business Council (NABC), a network 
organization established in 1946 that aims to promote and position the Dutch private sector in 
Africa. What in 2007 was an organization with one director, one intern and around 80 member 
companies is now an influential platform manned by a team of almost 25 persons, and representing 
almost 400 Dutch member companies (and an increasing number of African companies). It has 
developed sectorial platforms, covering many different sectors, and is setting up a network of 
offices in Africa. NABC is organizes trade missions, conferences, seminars and business clubs for 
networking, and advice concerning business opportunities, investments or regulations in Africa. It 
also manages six strategic programs in different industrial sectors, consisting of Dutch companies, 
knowledge institutes and the Dutch government. These sectors are the ports, the dairy, water, 
poultry and vegetable sector.  
The above described mix of government departments, non-governmental organizations, facilities, 
funds and programs can be simplified by the distinction between actors and tools: The whole of 
facilities, funds and programs has been coined the ‘business toolkit’ (cf. 
‘Bedrijfsleveninstrumentarium’). It can be broken down in two types of instruments: (1) the 
instruments for private sector development in developing countries and (2) trade- and investment 
instruments for (Dutch) companies that want to do business in developing countries 
(Rijksoverheid, 2014). The idea is that, in order to link trade to development cooperation, Dutch 
embassies in low- and middle income countries as well as (Dutch) companies can make an appeal to 
this elaborate package of instruments. In this the role of the embassies should not be 
underestimated. RVO and FMO are the main implementing agents, with DDE managing the 
participating in multi-donor initiatives. With all of the above and more, the Dutch institutional 
capacity to engage with the private sector in a development context seems extremely well-
developed. However, this also presents challenges with regard to duplication and complementarity. 
This is demonstrated by the DGGF, of which the execution of the first two tracks (financing 
Dutch and local SMEs) in fact falls easily within the institutional capacity and expertise of FMO. 
Instead the DGGF instead been established within RVO,23 a decision that was not supported by 
all. 
 
23  RVO acts as a coordinating front office of DGGF. The execution of tracks 2 and 3 are done by PWC/Triple Jump and Atradius Dutch 
State Business respectively. 
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5.3.2 United Kingdom 
Total ODA budget (estimated for 2015/2016): 16,98 billion Euro (cfr.12,2 billion £); Budget for ‘economic 
development’: 2,5 billion Euro (cfr.1.8 billion £); Main executing actors & instruments: country and regional 
offices, private sector department, CDC, PIDG (UK AID Network, 2014; Interview DFID 2014). 
It is my intention to recast DFID as a government department that understands the private sector 
(…)’, said Secretary of State for International Development, Andrew Mitchell, on 12 October 2010 
(DFID, 2012). His words resonated one year later, in the DfID strategy on how to put the private 
sector centre stage in its activities: ‘Our new approach to working with the private sector is about us 
doing more with and for private enterprise, extending this work in new areas, and doing it better. 
We want private sector thinking to become as much part of DFID’s DNA as our work with 
charities and governments’ (DFID & UKaid, 2011, p. 2). That same year DfID launched its Private 
Sector Department to help raise the level, extent and effectiveness of its engagement with the 
private sector (DfID, 2011, p. 1).  
In 2013 UK Secretary of State for International Development, Justine Greening, decided to further 
ramp up DfiD’s work on economic growth. DfiD already had a substantial economic development 
portfolio, with around a fifth of its spending focused on this area. The budget for economic 
development stood at approximately 974 million Euro (cf. 700 million £) for the fiscal year 
2014/2015. In 2015 DFID is scaling up financial and staff resources further. It has committed to 
spend 2,5 billion Euro (£1.8 billion) of its budget on economic development by 2015/16, more 
than doubling the amount spent in 2012/13. That is on top of indirect funding through core 
contributions to multilateral organisations. DFID has also doubled its number of private sector 
development advisers over the past two years and recruited a new Director General for Economic 
Development in June 2014 to help drive forward policy thinking and influencing, and manage our 
growing investments. 
Institutionally, the economic development portfolio is delivered through several actors: bilateral 
programmes, support to and engagement with multilateral development banks and other partners, 
and increasingly through working directly with businesses (see Figure 5.2). 
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Figure 5.2 Overview of main UK development actors involved in PSD and PSE  
 
 
* The filled boxed show the main implementing actors 
Three big structures within DfID channel work on and with the private sector: the Country and 
Regional Programs, the Economic Development Directorate and the Policy and Global 
Departments. The Economic Development Directorate,24 and more specifically its Private Sector 
Department (PSD) supports engagement with business across the organisation, sets out the general 
private sector strategy and manages DFID’s shareholding in the CDC Group - the UK’s 
development finance institution - and the Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG). 
CDC and PIDG mobilise private sector investment in developing countries. In addition, PSD 
manages several programmes that stimulate financial and capital markets and promote responsible 
business practices. Two additional tools in its private sector toolbox are the Business Innovation 
Hub and the Business Engagement Hub. PSD works with a budget of 0.6 billion £ and a staff of 40 
(up from 10 at the start in 2010). There are approximately an additional 60 private sector advisors 
across the DfID network. 
With a budget of roughly 1 billion £, the Country and Regional Programs spend the majority of the 
funds dedicated to economic development. Guided by the overall private sector strategy set out by 
the PSD, country and regional offices can further develop the private sector strategy and adapt it to 
the local context. In India this work also includes the management of a portfolio of investment of 
about 50 million X a year to mobilise private investment with development outcomes. Although 
not supporting local businesses directly, DfID takes a rather direct route by participating in local 
funds that invest in local companies (Interview DfID, January 2015). 
 
24  The Economic Development Directorate promotes better coherence across all DFID’s economic development activities, and will 
also address other related strategic priorities for DFID such as girls and women, the golden thread, governance for economic 
development, climate change, the particular needs of fragile and conflict-affected states, and more effective multilateral 
delivery(DfID, 2014). 
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Other actors are the International Finance Institutions Department (IFID) within EDD covering 
all the work with multilateral organisations: the World Bank, IFC, MICO, African Bank, Asian 
bank, ... and the Growth & Resilience Department, which is responsible for climate finance and has 
several investment instruments with links to the private sector. 
Zooming out, other governmental actors that can be involved in mobilizing private resources for 
development are Export Finance UK, UK Trade & Investment that focuses on working with UK 
businesses and the Foreign Office.  
5.3.3 Switzerland 
Total ODA volume 2013: CHF 2962.8 million; Main Actors: Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation 
(SDC): ODA 2013, CHF 2907.6 and Economic Cooperation and Development Domain of the State 
Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO): ODA 2013, CHF 332.2 Million 
In the Swiss case the institutional set-up also plays an important role with regard to its approach 
towards the private sector. This is because Swiss development cooperation is implemented by two 
agencies: Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation (SDC), which is a federal office within 
the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the Economic Co-operation and Development Domain of 
the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), which is a federal office within the Department 
of Economic Affairs, Education and Research. Together SDC and SECO deliver about 70% of 
Swiss ODA, of which SDC had in 2013 a share of about 85% and SECO of 15%. Both agencies 
had their specific mandate grounded in the Federal Act on international development cooperation 
and humanitarian aid of 1976. In practice there has been a division of labour, with SDC mostly 
partnered with CSOs, while SECO was more engaged with the private sector.  
Figure 5.3 Overview of main Swiss development actors involved in PSD and PSE  
 
* The filled boxed show the implementing actors. 
To increase its development partnerships with the private sector, SDC has recently formulated its 
own policy and criteria for engaging in partnerships. It has also established an Institutional 
Partnerships Division (IP) to promote and manage partnerships and the institutional dialogue of 
SDC with different types of Swiss organisations. Its mandate comprises the negotiation and 
monitoring of SDC’s programme contributions to Swiss NGOs as well as reflecting with private 
sector organizations on how to establish partnerships between SDC and private enterprises in line 
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with the development objective. With an operational budget to work with NGOs, and no 
operational budget to work with the private sector, the partnership focus remains on CSOs. 
However, with this unit SDC now has a formal anchor to engage with private sector. The IP also 
consults the operational units within SDC on how to engage with the privates sector. The 
operational units have budgets to spends, but there is no specific budget line dedicated to public 
private development partnerships. 
There is a clear increase in operational activities that involve the private sector, although in a 
decentralized way and depending strongly on the culture and priorities within different 
departments. In particular in the Global Cooperation Department and its global programs aiming at 
mitigating global risks with regard to climate change, water, food security and migration but also in 
the Employment and Income Division of the Regional Cooperation the private sector has been an 
actor ‘incontournable’ for quite some time, which also means more experience has been built on 
how ‘to deal’ with the private sector. In other domains this is less the case and the hesitation to 
work with the private sector and the lack of expertise to do so are bigger. All in all, the engagement 
with the private sector increases in all departments. This trend is due to the fact that 2013-2016 
Message on Development Cooperation puts increased emphasis on private sector development in 
general. In 2013, SDC also published its positon towards partnerships with the private sector 
(DDC, 2013). It defines partnerships as alliances with mutual obligations that can contribute to 
achieving its development objectives (SDC, 2013b). The policy has a clear and sound rationale, and 
stipulates criteria on the basis of which SDC can decide to partner or not to partner with certain 
private companies. Those include criteria regarding human rights, labour rights, environment and 
governance. It also points out the principles to found a partnership on, such as additionality and 
transparency.  
Traditionally, SECO is responsible for private sector development in developing countries due to 
its thematic competence and expertise. SECO is a federal office within the Federal Department of 
Economic Affairs, Education and Research (EAER). It has one domain dealing with Economic 
Cooperation and Development (SECO/WE) with the mandate of supporting the economic 
integration of developing countries in-to the world economy, for which it gets an ODA budget. Its 
four main areas of intervention are supporting private sector development and entrepreneurship, 
trade, infrastructure and strengthening economic and financial policies. It actively partners with the 
private sector to better achieve its development objectives. SECO has also clarified its approach 
towards partnering with the private sector, and includes similar principles as SDC. However, it is 
less explicit about the criteria it uses to select private partners (SECO, 2013). It is interesting to 
situate this mandate within the overall mandate of SECO. Its overall aim is to ensure sustainable 
economic growth by putting in place the necessary regulatory and economic policy conditions. Its 
role is mostly on the domestic front, were SECO fosters social peace and employment by providing 
an interface between business, social partners and government. SECO also facilitate access to all 
markets for Swiss goods and services and investment and is active in the formulating of efficient, 
fair and transparent rules for the world economy.  
Another important actor leveraging private sector flows is the Swiss Investment Fund for Emerging 
Markets (SIFEM). SIFEM, the Swiss Development Finance Institution was set up in 2005 as a 
privately maintained stock company in order to manage the investment portfolio of SECO. In 
2011, SIFEM has been transferred into the full proprietorship of the Swiss Confederation, and the 
entire investment portfolio of SECO is being assigned to SIFEM. The Board of SIFEM has been 
selected by the Swiss Government, but the portfolio management of SIFEM is outsourced to a 
management company called Obviam. Unlike the conventional instruments of development 
cooperation, investments made by SIFEM generate earnings. Most projects are co-financed with 
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other European development finance institutions and regional or international development banks. 
In addition, wherever possible, SIFEM mobilizes capital from local and international private 
investors for its projects. SIFEM states to be committed to invest according to international best 
practice Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) standards in order to contribute to 
sustainable development in its target markets. It too has developed a policy document that explains 
through which criteria it pursues responsible investment (SIFEM, n.d.). 
5.3.4 Convergence and divergence 
Looking at the institutional changes across the three different donors, one common feature 
emerges: as the private sector gains importance on the development agenda, the institutional 
capacity for private sector engagement and economic cooperation is increased. This is the case for 
the UK, with the establishment and the subsequent grow of its private sector department. It is the 
case for The Netherlands, with the institutional concentration of a big part of the private sector 
toolkit under Netherlands Enterprise Agency (RVO) and the establishment of the DGGF within 
the realm of RVO. Finally, it is also the case in Switzerland, where the institutional set-up already 
provided for an actor specialised in economic development cooperation (SECO), while the other 
implementing agency (SDC) is now steadily developing its position on, expertise in and experience 
with private sector. Increased capacity may be a common trait, but it has been done in different 
ways: The UK built in-house expertise within its development cooperation agency, at headquarters 
as well as in country and regional offices. The Netherlands mostly outsourced, tapping into the 
capacity of the Netherlands Enterprise Agency and its development bank FMO. Switzerland 
combines both, adding some capacity within SDC while at the same time maintaining a strong 
SECO and outsourcing the management of its DFI to a private company.  
5.4 Policy choices 
5.4.1 The Netherlands 
The eye catcher in the current Dutch development policy is the win-win principle. Economic 
growth leading to poverty reduction in partner countries is one side of the coin, a clear benefit for 
Dutch companies and Dutch commercial interests the other. The underlying idea is that a clear 
focus is indispensable for an effective and efficient development policy, and that development 
cooperation should in that case focus on those domains where The Netherlands have an 
comparative advantage and can offer added value. Consequently, the development policy focus is in 
line with the economic policy. Through a participatory policy dialogue, The Netherlands selected 9 
top sectors25, sectors in which the Dutch private sector excels at a global level. Foreign affairs, 
foreign trade and development cooperation policy are at least partly geared towards strengthening 
those top sectors. This is shown by the choice for the productive sectors water and food security as 
2 out of 4 ‘spear heads’ of the Dutch development cooperation26, an explicit attempt to remain 
aligned with the Dutch top sectors.  
 
On all four axes development cooperation attempts to improve the investment climate and increase 
its cooperation with the private sector, through up-scaling, more public-private partnerships, the 
deployment and use of an elaborate business ‘toolkit’ and regular strategic consultation with private 
sector (Knapen, 2011). Looking from a role-perspective most of the instruments in this business 
 
25  Er zijn 9 topsectoren: Tuinbouw en uitgangsmaterialen; Agri & Food; Water; Life sciences & Health; Chemie; High tech; Energie; 
Logistiek; Creatieve industrie. 
26  The other two being: sexual and reproductive health and rights; and law and order. 
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toolkit approach the Dutch private sector as a beneficiary of financial support, or beneficiaries of 
capacity building, network initiatives and efforts to improve the overall business climate. More than 
in the other cases, private sector has participated and still participates in the policy dialogue on 
development policy. 
With its strong focus and specialization, the policy framework may not always fit with what is 
needed most and working best in specific partner countries. A case in point is the Dutch 
cooperation with South Africa, where a transition phase from aid to trade is almost coming to its 
end. During this transition, the longstanding and successful cooperation in the educational sector 
has been phased out, as closing the skills gap was considered a South African responsibility that 
could not be solved in a sustainable manner through development cooperation. However, 
considering the main challenge for South Africa today, many analysts nominate the enormous skills 
gap as the main obstacle for a strong private sector and a decrease in inequality, and thus one of the 
crucial levers to address some of South Africa’s biggest remaining development challenges. 
Matching the new development agenda with the needs in low income and fragile states also proves 
to be challenging. The IOB evaluation of the Dutch PSD noticed the large portion of resources 
going to middle and high income countries. For middle income countries, this was 60% of the total 
PSD means between 2006 and 2011 (Ministerie Buitenlandse Zaken (IOB), 2014). It is clear that 
this presents a challenge for the Dutch business toolkit, as it is demand driven. With no 
applications for support of activities or partnerships in fragile states, no support can be contributed. 
Especially the combination of an increase of activities in low income countries or fragile states on 
the one hand and the increase of Dutch SMEs involvement in development on the other hand 
proves to be challenging. The current tools can provide credit for willing entrepreneurs but they 
don’t address the huge risks for doing business in these countries, and SMEs are often not ready to 
take that type of risk. Also, the investment in project development itself is often an obstacle for 
SMEs, although different tools in the toolkit have been adapted to become more accessible in that 
regard (e.g. ORIO will be replaced by DRIVE where project development is included in the 
support offered). However, the possibilities to actively stimulate and mobilize Dutch companies to 
invest in fragile states are limited, because several of the business tools remain strictly untied. Some 
tools, such as the DGGF, do have a limited budget for technical assistance that can be tapped into 
to put extra effort in facilitation those entrepreneurs that do target fragile states. At the moment, no 
benchmark for support to business in fragile states is used (Interview RVO, January 2015). 
5.4.2 United Kingdom 
Important and influential is DfID’s continued focus on poor people in poor countries, and 
especially in fragile or failed countries27. For the fiscal year of 2015-2016 DfID’s overall budget will 
increase by 7.8% - i.e. £809m. Of this sum, over 95% - i.e. £10.3bn - will be in the form of ODA in 
2015/16. More than 30% will go to fragile and conflict-affected countries. The argumentation 
behind, is the concentration of a high number of poor in less and less low-income countries (LICs) 
and fragile or failed states, although the majority of the poor may currently live in middle-income 
countries (MICs). Offering limited prospects for breaking out of the poverty trap, fragile or failed 
states are considered a logic focal point for development cooperation (Interview DfID, January 
2015). However, especially for economic development and working on and with the private sector, 
it is also considered to be the most challenging context. A DfID research on private sector actors 
 
27  Currently 21 of the 28 DfID partner countries are considered as ‘fragile’, but DFID uses a much broader definition than the World 
Bank. E.g. Kenya is also considered as a fragile country.  
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interested to invest in these countries revealed that for most businesses the risks are too high, with 
the exception of the extractive industry.  
At the operational level, the focus on LICs and especially fragile or failed states is demonstrated by 
the newly introduced ‘development grid’ system, a measurement system that plots out the 
development relevance of the investments of CDC, with the aim of pushing credit and other 
activities to the harder places and the more development relevant sectors. CDCs overall portfolio 
has to be situated in the top-right quadrant, where the challenges are high and the relevance big. 
CDC also has a specialized frontier investment team to push the boundaries (Interview DfID, 
January 2015). Another instrument specifically targeting fragile states is the political risk insurance. 
This instrument has been in use for only a few years, but already had to deal with a major setback 
when all investments in the pipeline for Iraq fell through after the arrival of ISIS.  
In line with the observation that British commercial interests don’t feature prominently in the 
current policy discourse, activities aimed at UK business are mostly aimed at mobilizing their 
resources and aligning their activities with development objectives. DfID does maintain informal 
relations with most British multinationals, a few financial sector players and with the extractive 
business, as these are the companies that have a network in DfID’s partner countries. More 
formally it also has strategic partnerships with a number of big companies (e.g. Unilever), that do 
not involve financial support but are mostly about exchange of expertise and networks. In role-
terms DfID seems to approach the UK private sector mostly as a provider of resources or as 
reformers. DfID also has a program to facilitate SME access to developing country business 
opportunities and inform them about development cooperation procurement. However, all of its 
programs and instruments are open to non-UK companies. An overview of the whole of UK’s 
development activities regarding private sector suggest a dual focus: on the one hand a number of 
instruments aim to tackle the obstacles hindering local private sector and in particular SMEs, on the 
other hand the biggest instruments aim to leverage international private finance.  
5.4.3 Switzerland 
In the case of the SDC, the current work with the private sector is dispersed and decentralized, with 
different departments experiment with different approaches. For example, the water department 
has quite developed and direct relationships with the providers, the food security department so far 
focuses on relations with ‘their’ private sector namely the smallholder farmers, and the immigration 
department is exploring how to engage with private sector to solve some issues in the field of 
remittances. Without a clear oversight of who is doing what and with how much money involved, it 
is difficult to identify where the emphasis lies. It also shows that the SDC has yet to develop 
specific tools and instruments that reflect the range of partnerships it ambitions to have with 
private companies.  
A first step has been taken with the organization of a stakeholder dialogue with private sector to 
map private sector expectations towards development cooperation. Private sector actors indicated 
that the first priority should be to create an enabling environment. Secondly, and unexpectedly, they 
wanted development cooperation to assist them in reorienting their core business towards 
development impact, more so than to provide financial support. This corresponded to what the 
2013 OECD peer review observed: that Swiss private sector representatives are eager to go beyond 
the traditional relationship of contracting the private sector to deliver development projects and 
programmes to engage in strategic partnerships that contribute to sustainable development 
(OECD-DAC, 2013). 
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Considering the roles private sector can play in development cooperation, Swiss development 
officials point out that, to some extent, all roles are touched on by the Swiss development activities. 
However, some more than others: With its work on knowledge exchange, technology exchange and 
domestic resource management and generation, SECO engages with the private sector in the role 
of beneficiary as well as provider of resources (roles 1-4) but it is currently developing its strategies 
that appeal more to the private sector as a reformer or a developer, and it is increasing its support 
to the role of private sector as a participant in policy dialogue.  
At SDC a similar trend is visible, with a clear goal of developing especially the relations in which the 
private sector takes the role of reformer, developer or participant in policy dialogue. One area in 
which this is being pursues is the financial sector. The financial sector is considered as an important 
source of expertise and resources to be tapped into. Financial sector development is consequently 
one of the 3 main axes of SDC’s employment and income strategy, and it is involving the sector 
actively in this domain. In its current work, the SDC does not so much see the private sector as a 
beneficiary of assistance, expect for the small holder or its role as an incubator and match maker 
between Swiss businesses who want to become active in developing countries. 
5.4.4 Convergence and divergence 
Donors who embark on deepening the links between the private sector and development 
cooperation face quite some policy choices. Arguably ‘the private sector’ does not exist. It refers to 
a very diverse group of private sector players. What private sector actors to work with is one of the 
choices donors have to make. What types of instruments to implement and what type of role to 
play in the relation with the private sector is another. The examples discussed illustrate how these 
choices can differ. Whereas The Netherlands aim to engage the Dutch private sector, the UK has 
very little policy or instruments in place that target the British private sector. Switzerland combines 
two approaches: SECO does have a clear mandate to engage and support Swiss private sector. SDC 
has few tools to pull the Swiss private sector into development cooperation but has chosen a 
strategic approach by building its relationship with the Swiss financial sector. 
UK and to some extent The Netherlands have clear ambitions to deepen their activity and impact 
in least developing countries and fragile states. However, both donors find it extremely challenging 
to work in this context with private sector. The need for a stable, regional ‘hub’ as an operating 
base is difficult to reconcile with the policy decision to phase out development cooperation with 
middle income countries. Also, private sector actors that are willing and able to operate in LDCs 
and fragile state are often extractive industry or MNCs, and may not fall within the ideals scope of 
the PS4D policy.  
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6 |  Conclusions & future research 
A considerable amount of conceptual confusion continues to hinder reflections and debate on the 
role of the private sector in development cooperation. The exercise of defining the different 
concepts and determining how they fit within the different interlinked policy agendas resembles a 
3D puzzle more so than a set of Russian petrushkas: the different concepts and agenda’s do not fit 
neatly one in the other but form a complex and dynamic body with lots of overlap but also crucial 
differences and particularities. This complex picture also shows how broad the ‘mobilizing private 
resources for development’ agenda actually is. 
Deconstructing the meaning of ‘mobilizing private resources for development’ reveals how the 
different instruments used to achieve it, can be characterized by the main obstacle they aim to 
tackle as well as by the type of resource they attempt to mobilize, or the type of private actor they 
target. The typology of roles stimulates reflection on what role for the private sector actors each 
instrument implies. A general overview of the different groups of instruments based on these 
frameworks indicates that the instruments addressing risk and a lack of finance are gaining traction. 
It also reveals how instruments are usually based on an assumption of reciprocity: private sector 
may benefit from an initial investment of public development funds but is expected to commit 
additional resources in return. However, this assumption of additionality and a leveraging effect is 
not always confirmed when looking at the actual practice.  
Exploring how different donors are engaging with the mobilizing private resources agenda and 
instruments also reveals some interesting common issues. One observation is that the institutional 
set-up inevitably has a considerable impact on the (possibilities to implement) policy decisions 
regarding private sector’s role in development cooperation. UK, The Netherlands and Switzerland 
have substantial institutional capacity to work on private sector in development. Belgium does have 
some actors that have a relevant mandate and that may have the necessary expertise, but in 
comparison its institutional capacity is rather limited and may also be hindered by mandates that do 
not always enable the use of the most appropriate instruments in a specific context. 
 
This study, conducted in the framework of BeFinD, has taken an exploratory approach in order to 
lay the ground work for follow-up research on the Financing for Development Agenda by other 
members of the consortium. Several specific components touched on in this study will be 
investigated more in-depth (by IOB and especially by CRED) between now and end of 2017. 
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APPENDIX 1 OVERVIEW INTERVIEWS  
appendix 1 Overview interviews 
As part of the data collection, semi-structured interviews have been conducted. A list of 
interviewees is provided below.  
Table a1.1 Interviews 
Name Function Date interview  
REIS CONDE Jaime 
 
 
Head of Unit - Multi-country programmes 
EuropeAid (DG DEVCO), Directorate C, 
Sustainable Growth and Development, 
Financial Instruments 
15/01/2015 in Brussels 
 
EU 
EGLI Patrick Deputy Head Division Global Institutions  
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs 
FDFA, Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation SDC  
19/01/2015 in Bern  SW 
RIES Andrea Analysis and Policy Division & in charge of 
OECD-DAC Desk 
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs 
FDFA, Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation SDC 
19/01/2015 in Bern  SW 
DIJKSTERHUIS Robert  Afdelingsmanager Internationale 
Samenwerking / Boardmember International 
Programmes RVO.nl 
15/01/2015 in Den Haag NL 
DAVIES Rob Head of the Private Sector Policy Team and 
Lead on DFID’s new capital investments, 
Department for International Development's 
(DFID) 
19/01/2015 in London 
 
UK 
THOMPSON Chris  Economist, Private Sector Department, 
Department for International Development's 
(DFID) 
19/01/2015 in London 
 
UK 
VERLÉ Paul Head of Expertise Department, BTC/CTB 14/01/2015 in Brussels BE 
DRICOT Yves Directorate General Development 
Cooperation (DGD), Thematic Direction 
D2, Director i.o. 
15/01/2015 in Brussels BE 
VERMAERKE Pieter Directorate General Development 
Cooperation (DGD), the Direction Inclusive 
Growth (D2.2) 
11/02/2015 (phone) BE 
JULLIEN Gaëlle Directorate General Development 
Cooperation (DGD), the Direction Inclusive 
Growth (D2.2) 
23 &25/02/2015 (phone) BE 
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